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The purpose of this study was to determine whether there are any significant decreases in 
the safety and effectiveness of pilots by age 60. The data for this study came from records 
of general aviation accidents (i.e., for private pilots, commercial pilots, and air transport 
pilots), and airline accidents (Part 121). These accident data were acquired from many 
specialized aviation data banks; these include: NTSB, AOPA, FAA, and the COMSIS 
Research Corporation. The data were organized into groups according to the ages of the 
pilots-in-command responsible for the accidents. Groupings progress in five-year 
increments starting at 20-24, and ending with 55-59. The data were analyzed in terms of 
both accidents per 1,000 pilots and accidents per 100,000 annual hours flown. The results 
indicate that age and experience both affect safety. The magnitude of these effects and their 
implications on flight safety are discussed. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Aging ultimately plays a dramatic and significant role in a pilot's ability to fly an 
aircraft safely and efficiently. But just how early do these effects manifest? At what point 
in a pilot's career do they become operationally significant? Past research on the effects of 
aging on aviators has noted progressive deteriorations in physiological and psychological 
functions with increasing age. In an early study, Shriver (1953) focused on the effects of 
aging on aviators and found that physical abilities, motivation and the ability to improve 
skill and technique, and aircrew performance lend to decline with age. In the same light, 
Gerathewohl (1978a) noted that the aging process is characterized by progressive 
deteriorations in both physiological and psychological functions. 
Aviators have a number of tasks to execute in their environment, especially those 
who operate large complex jetliners that employ the latest technologies. One report (Select 
Committee on Aging, 1979) noted that an aviator's ability to perform highly skilled tasks, 
to adapt to new and changing conditions, to process incoming information, to resist 
mental and physical fatigue, to maintain physical stamina, and to perform efficiently in a 
complex and often stressful environment begins to decline early in middle life and 
continues to deteriorate from that point on. However, Mohlcr (1981) refuted that 
judgment and reasoning tend to be preserved and may compensate for some of these 
losses. Nevertheless, these too are eventually eroded by the aging process. 
The process of aging is a very complex matter. The literature indicates that there 
are significant variations in performance, abilities, and tolerances among individuals of the 
same chronological age (Braune & Wickcns, 1984; Gerathewohl, 1978b; Institute of 
Medicine [IOM], 1981; Shriver, 1953). Hcrtzog (1985) noted that not all people age at 
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the same rate or decline by the same amount. Almost all of the physiological and 
psychological data that we now have show an increasing variability with age, meaning that 
age alone progressively loses its predictive effectiveness. This finding has become one of 
the most distinguishing characteristics of cross-sectional studies of aging (Rodin, 1987). 
Despite these variations among individuals, the Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA) enforces an upper age limit of 60 years of age for U.S. airline pilots. All other 
pilots not flying under these particular types of operations are not affected by this 
regulation. One report (General Accounting Office [GAO], 1989) found that a total of 67 
petitions for exemption on behalf of 418 pilots have all been denied since the 
implementation of this regulation. There has also been some debate as to whether or not 
it is fair to enforce this rule for airline pilots without the possibility of waivers or special 
exemptions (also known as special issuances). 
There are both positive and negative aspects associated with this age limit rule. 
Some issues are not closely tied to questions of science. For example, the rule eliminates 
some of the most highly paid salaries to senior captains and becomes economically 
advantageous to an airline. In addition, it is easily enforced since it only requires the 
FAA and individual airlines to monitor a pilot's age. Lastly, it eliminates these so-called 
age decrement problems before any major deteriorations in health or performance are 
likely to affect flight safety. 
On the other hand, enforcing this rule on the basis of age alone is clearly a form of 
age discrimination. But, is it economically practical to determine which pilots beyond age 
60 retain their skills and capacities and which pilots do not? If all the enhanced medical 
screening procedures and technologies were used, the average annual cost for a first class 
medical exam would increase from $300 to over $1000 (Office of Technology 
Assessment, 1990). It should be noted that first class medical certificates are only 
required for those airline pilots who serve as pilol-in-command (PIC); e.g., the captain. 
In the same respect, the rule may aggravate the serious shortage of qualified pilots that the 
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U.S. airline industry is anticipating. Additionally, one must be aware of the possible 
inconsistencies when medical exemptions are granted to younger and less qualified pilots 
for problems which are potentially as threatening to safety as aging alone. 
The FAA is responsible for promoting aviation safety; therefore, it is supposed to 
regularly re-examine the medical and scientific advancements that may affect this age 
regulation (GAO, 1989). Inconsistencies in the safety levels of older pilots as reported 
by various studies make the rule even more controversial; e.g., using the two highest 
experience categories, Serwer (1990) found the accident rate for older pilots (60-69 years 
old) to be almost three times less than those rates for younger pilots (20-29 years old); 
whereas Golaszewski (1983) found the accident rate for older pilots to be higher than the 
younger pilots' rate, suggesting that older pilots are likely to be less safe. Why? Is this 
because the performance capabilities of pilots decline as they grow older, or can these 
age-related changes be attributed to other factors? It should be apparent that this is a very 
complex issue with many details and requires an objective data based conclusion. 
Statement of the Problem 
The purpose of this study is to determine whether the available data indicate that 
there are any significant decreases in the safety and effectiveness of pilots by age 60; e.g., 
the incidence of accidents increases as a function of age. Do older pilots pose a greater risk 
due to either sudden incapacitation or undetected decrements in physical or mental 
performance? If so, at what age? Does the current arbitrary age limit for airline pilots 
achieve the system's purpose of maximizing safely? 
Review of the Related Literature 
It is clear that a better understanding of the aging process and its effects on flight 
safety is needed. A large proportion of the literature reviewed supports the hypothesis of 
a progressive decline in abilities with advancing age. However, there are some recently 
published reports that suggest that the data on aging needs to be reanalyzed and/or re-
evaluated. For example, Labouvic-Vicf (1985) noted that the very concept of aging is 
undergoing a shift in theoretical emphasis. Labouvie-Vief indicated that the question, "Is 
there decline in aging per se?" may no longer be the most useful one to pose (p. 501). 
Additionally, we need to recognize the myths and stereotypes typically associated with 
the aging process. Eisdorfer (1985) reported on the mythologies of aging and noted that 
the first myth of the aging process is that age brings with it a series of functional declines 
and decreases a person's ability to be productive. The second myth is that one's ability to 
perform a given task decreases as we grow older. The work of these writers suggests 
that it may be diseases that are more common in the elderly population that affect safety 
rather than age per se. 
Physiological Effects of Aging 
Gerontological studies prior to the 1960s were based on older subjects taken from 
hospitals, nursing homes, and other institutional settings (Mohler, 1981). Until recently, 
as reported by Rodin (1987), research on aging has only emphasized the losses associated 
with the aging process. However, in a break from tradition, Rodin noted that we know 
biological vulnerabilities associated with old age are capable of being reduced or made less 
severe. Likewise, Bortz (1980) found that many changes commonly attributed to aging 
can be retarded by an active exercise program. These findings are repealed in a number of 
reports that attest to the benefits of exercise in various human disease states (Bruce & 
Fisher, 1987; Fox & Haskell, 1968; Hellerstcin, Hornslen, Goldbarg, Burlando, 
Friedman, Hirsch, & Marik, 1967; Mohler, 1982; The Medical Study Group, 1988). 
The physiological literature indicates that there usually are physical decrements in 
vision with increasing age (Corso, 1987; Edwards, 1990; Eisdorfer, 1985; Fozard, 1990; 
Gault, 1990; IOM, 1981; Kline & Schiebcr, 1985; Sanders & McCormick, 1987; 
Shriver, 1953). Gault noted that the pupils tend to become smaller, especially after 60, 
therefore restricting the amount of light available for proper eye functioning. Likewise, 
Kline and Schieber found that the decline in dark adaption appears to be particularly 
marked after age 60. In terms of quickness, the older eye adapts to the dark the same as 
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the younger one; however, it does not attain the high level of sensitivity (i.e., more light 
is needed to perform a given task). Gault also noted that a pilot of 60 might need ten 
times the amount of light than a 25-year-old. However, the role of eyeglasses and 
cockpit lighting are issues relevant to this topic, but require further study. Other research 
(Mohler, Bedell, Ross, & Veregge, 1967) analyzed accidents involving pilots over 60 
and found that more than 51% of the accidents occurred during the landing phase of 
operations, where eye-sight is critical. However, Mohler et al. did not report the 
percentage of accidents during the landing phase for younger pilots; thus it is not possible 
to assess the significance of their findings on a comparative basis.
 # 
The literature also suggests that there arc age-related declines in audition with 
advancing age (Corso, 1987; Edwards, 1990; Fozard, 1990; IOM, 1981; Olsho & 
Harkins, 1985; Ribak, Hornung, Karl, Froom, Wolfstein, & Ashkcnazi, 1985; The 
Medical Study Group, 1988; Von Gierke & Nixon, 1971). Corso indicated that the two 
primary factors that produce hearing deficits are age and noise. The Medical Study Group 
noted that hearing impairment is inevitable with advancing age, particularly in the higher 
frequency range (i.e., above 1,000 Hz). These hearing changes are often characterized as 
progressive and irreversible. Presbycusis is the term most widely used to refer to age-
related changes in hearing ability. Olsho and Harkins noted that presbycusis is one of the 
major sensory changes associated with aging in humans. Nonetheless, some 
compensatory devices (e.g., hearing aides, volume controlled headsets) may adequately 
compensate for this age-related change, but this too requires further study. 
Does a hearing disability have any operational significance to pilots in a crew 
environment? If the loss is significant, can it slip through the recurrent Line Oriented 
Flight Training (LOFT) sessions and first class medical examinations? In light of the 
latter question, Reinhart (1991) reported that pilots intentionally seek out the easiest 
medical examiner to avoid learning more than they really want to know; thus, in terms of 
pilot health, what the public expects and what the public gets may be two different things. 
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The most important aspect of hearing for pilots is the ability to understand speech 
and to distinguish between the different types of warning signals, especially in a noisy and 
sometimes stressful cockpit. However, Szafran (1969) found no evidence of any 
discrepancy in the ability to recognize a signal from a background of white noise with 
subjects between 40 and 60 years of age. Although some literature suggests that declines 
in hearing occur at all adult age groups, not just the old, the IOM (1981) report found that 
80% of people with hearing problems are over 45, and nearly 55% are 65 or older. 
Although these age-related declines in audition have been widely reported, the relevance of 
these changes to the pilots' job performance has not yet been established. 
Psychological Effects of Aging 
As people grow older, physiological and psychological changes inevitably take 
place. One of the least disputed and most pronounced findings in the gerontological 
literature is the slowing in cognitive processing that occurs with advancing age (Braune & 
Wickens, 1984; Gilbert & Levee, 1971; Hartley, Harker, & Walsh, 1980; Morrow, 
Leirer, & Yesavage, 1990; Reese & Rodeheaver, 1985; Salthouse, 1985; Spilich, 1983). 
This slowing in cognitive abilities has a number of closely related functions. The 
literature indicates that reaction time, attention, memory, problem solving, decision 
making, and intelligence, for the most part, tend to decline with increasing age, and have 
applications in the operational aspects of piloting an aircraft. 
Several studies note that as we become older, reaction time has a tendency to slow 
down (Braune & Wickens, 1984; Braune, Wickens, Strayer, & Stokes, 1985; Cann, 
1990; Craik & McDowd, 1987; Eisdorfer, 1985; Fozard, Vercruyssen, Reynolds, & 
Hancock, 1990; Gault, 1990; IOM, 1981; Murrell, 1970; Salthouse, 1985; Shock, 
Greulich, Andres, Arenberg, Costa, Lakatta, & Tobin, 1984; Simon, 1967; Vercruyssen, 
Carlton, & Diggles-Buckles, 1989; Wilkinson & Allison, 1989). It is probably one of the 
only aging effects that researchers have no disagreement over (Tsang, 1989). Gault noted 
that a younger person can react more quickly and strongly to urgent situations than can his 
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older counterpart. However, older persons who retain response quickness do compete 
well with younger individuals. But how well? It may be true that a slower reaction time 
might be critical in the landing phase during which a number of tasks must be carried out 
rapidly. Nevertheless, Braune and Wickens suggested that a reasonable explanation for 
this reduction in response time could be attributable to a more conservative response, thus 
the responses are slower but more accurate. Additionally, Murrell found that reaction time 
could be improved with practice, regardless of age, but older individuals require much 
more practice than the younger subjects, whose performance improved immediately. 
On one hand, Eisdorfer (1985) asks whether or not a few milliseconds difference 
in time between an older and younger pilot has any practical significance. Eisdorfer 
contemplated whether the small changes in speed are more or less offset by the fact that 
the older pilot, having experienced many different adverse situations in the cockpit, would 
be able to judge each situation and perhaps deal with it faster? On the other hand, the IOM 
(1981) report suggested that there are some situations in airline operations during which a 
few hundred milliseconds are operationally significant. The example cited involves a pilot 
who has to abort a takeoff (e.g., engine out, engine fire, blown tire). This condition 
requires complex decision-making and a very short reaction time; and the slightest 
hesitation could result in a tragedy. 
It should also be asked whether an older pilot might be more easily overloaded in 
high workload situations where fatigue is likely to take its toll. Some research (e.g., 
Shriver, 1953; Schreuder, 1966) indicated that the increased susceptibility to mental 
fatigue is by far the most frequent type of change reported to occur with advancing age. 
It has also been noted (Higgins, Mertcns, McKcnzic, Funkhouser, White, & Milburn, 
1982) that fatigue can adversely affect not only the accuracy, but also the timeliness in 
performance. Other research (Collins & Mertcns, 1988; Mertens, Higgins, & McKenzie, 
1983) has found a similar relationship—that is, at higher levels of workload, 
performance decreased with age. 
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Botwinick (1978) noted that there arc two distinctive views when referring to 
reaction time. The first is that the general slowness in behavior is only a matter of the 
kinesthetics, and is thus of no importance to cognition. Therefore, the variety of tests 
which measure timed performance are unfair and inappropriate for testing older 
individuals. A contrary view offered by Braune and Wickens (1984) suggested that the 
speed of response is, nevertheless, a reflection of the central nervous system functioning 
and is most important to cognition. To this researcher's knowledge, there are no 
empirical data available that would conclusively support one view over the other. 
Attention, like memory and intelligence, is a multifaceted concept. Some research 
on aging and attention (e.g., McDowd & Birren, 1990; Stankov, 1988) has subdivided 
attention into the following four categories: divided, switching, sustained, and selective. 
Of particular importance to pilots are the categories of sustained attention (i.e., similar to 
vigilance) and selective attention (i.e., the ability to focus on a task while ignoring 
irrelevant aspects). McDowd and Birren noted that sustained attention is the activity of 
maintaining performance on a particular task over extended time; and vigilance, as noted in 
Botwinick (1978), can be conceptualized as the ability to detect rarely occurring signals 
over a prolonged period of time, or simply the efficiency with which small but perceivable 
changes in the external environment arc detected (Surwillo & Quilter, 1964). 
There have been some reports on age-related changes in vigilance tasks that have 
shown somewhat mixed results (e.g., see Surwillo & Quilter, 1964; Quilter, Giambra, & 
Benson, 1983). Despite their contradictions, one investigator (Botwinick, 1978) 
conducted a thorough literature review and noted that there have been several 
investigations of vigilance performance in relation to age, and they all lend to suggest that 
vigilance behavior declines with advancing age. A study by Thompson, Opton, and 
Cohen (1963) tested 55 male subjects in two age groups, 18-35 and 65-75 years of age. 
The results show a marked decrement in vigilance performance in the older subjects; and 
the more complicated and demanding the task, the greater the performance decrement. 
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The IOM (1981) discussed selective attention and vigilance in their report and noted that 
an individual's inability to maintain attention would lead to a decrement in performance 
on many tasks, and may even lead to accidents. Additionally, McDowd and Birren 
(1990) conducted an exhaustive review of the literature on aging and attention and found 
that the overall levels of performance on vigilance tasks appear to be reduced with 
advancing age. 
Piloting an aircraft, as reported in a letter in Select Committee on Aging (1985), 
often requires efficient extraction of information from a broad cluster of relevant and 
irrelevant stimuli in which it is embedded. It is necessary for pilots to monitor many 
sources of information (e.g., cockpit instruments, weather conditions) and focus their 
attention selectively. This selective focusing of attention is probably one of the more 
important functions. McDowd and Birren (1990) noted that individuals must filter out 
irrelevant information from their environment and select information that is task or goal 
oriented. Several studies were reviewed by McDowd and Birren and the prevalent findings 
suggest that older adults are more distracted by irrelevant information in visual search tasks 
than are young adults. This and other research (e.g., Rabbitt, 1977; Schonfield, 1974) 
suggest that older adults seem to have more difficulty discriminating relevant from 
irrelevant information. Despite these shortcomings, McDowd and Birren reported that 
some other research (e.g., Hoycr & Plude, 1982) has looked at the role of expertise in 
visual search tasks. They stated, "Knowing what to look for can speed search, and experts 
in particular domains [e.g., airline pilots] can compensate for sensory acquity problems by 
knowing which features of a search field are relevant and which are not" (p. 228). 
Gilbert and Levee (1971) indicated that nowhere have decrements in cognitive 
abilities been more evident than in the area of memory. Memory is often characterized as 
a basic human function. It is interrelated with perception, attention, decision making, 
judgment, information processing, and many other functions (Edwards, 1990). The 
literature on age differences in human memory includes a number of studies comparing 
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the performance of young and old adults on a variety of memory tests, and the prevalent 
view suggests that there is some decline in memory ability with increasing age 
(Botwinick, 1978; Craik, 1977; Craik & Byrd, 1982; Craik & McDowd, 1987; Gilbert & 
Levee, 1971; Gordon & Clark, 1974; Hartley, Harker, & Walsh, 1980; IOM, 1981; 
Moenster, 1972; Perlmutter, 1980; Perl mutter, Adams, Berry, Kaplan, Person, & 
Verdonik, 1987; Poon, 1985; Spilich, 1983). 
Patterns of age differences in six subtests of the Guild Memory Test were 
presented by Gilbert and Levee (1971) and the results showed a progressive decline in 
scores with increasing age. The 50-59 and 60-75 year old subjects showed statistically 
reliable decrements as compared to the 35-49 year old group. However, Perlmutter et al. 
(1987) concluded that age differences in reports on memory performance have not been 
entirely consistent. It appears that the failing memory is both a popular stereotype and a 
concern about aging. Younger adults are just as likely to experience memory failures, but 
are less concerned than older adults by them; thus, they are not reported as frequently. 
Some research (e.g., Perlmutter, 1980; Poon, 1985) has speculated that age merely 
increases a person's sensitivity or awareness about memory problems, and may not at all 
be related to memory failures. In addition, Perlmutter ct al. suggested that many of the 
memory problems that are observed later in life (e.g., recalling recent events, speed of 
recall) may be partially caused by factors that tend to be correlated with age, but are not 
inevitable consequences of aging. There is, however, a substantial amount of literature on 
the possible causes and theoretical paradigms of the changes in memory with advancing 
age, but that work is beyond the scope of this study. 
Many pilot activities frequently require memory operations. Pilots are often 
overloaded with data in flight situations (e.g., communication frequencies, navigation 
frequencies, altitudes, clearances, runways) and these memory functions often influence a 
pilot's judgment and performance. However, Braune and Wickens (1984) noted that 
there are weaknesses in memory that are not realistically controllable by regulation, 
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recurrent training, or even therapy. Can such deficits in memory result in a pilot's failure 
to detect a hazard or his/her inability to deal with the situation if encountered? In light of 
this question, Poon (1985) reviewed more than 200 reports and found that one study 
(Perlmutter, 1980) has suggested that although older adults probably have less efficient 
memory mechanisms, their rich experiences possibly allow them to perform some tasks at 
the same or higher level than younger adults. A similar remark was found in Hawkins 
(1987), who suggested that any memory deterioration which does occur may be offset by 
increasing experience and knowledge. Pilot experience is examined in a subsequent 
section of this study.
 # 
One report (Gilbert & Levee, 1971) indicated that there is evidence that the various 
facets of memory decline at different rates. In the same respect, Craik (1977) found that 
not all facets of the working memory are affected by the aging process. The working 
memory, also known as the primary memory or short-term store, is conceptualized as a 
limited capacity workspace that is used for temporary storage (Edwards, 1990; Leirer, 
Yesavage, & Morrow, 1989; Poon, 1985). No doubt, aircraft piloting is highly 
dependent on the working memory's capacity (e.g., different performance speeds, fuel 
systems, communication frequencies, navigation frequencies, emergency procedures). 
According to Leirer et al., many aspects of piloting are so complex that performance is 
limited by the working memory's speed or capacity to process rather than the availability 
of information for the pilot to use. Other research on the working memory was conducted 
by Spilich (1983) who compared young, elderly-normal, and elderly-impaired subjects 
whose mean ages were 21, 81, and 82 years of age respectively. The results showed a 
statistically significant difference in Wechslcr Memory Scale scores which suggests that 
the older subjects are less able to maintain new information in the working memory. 
These findings lend evidence to the suggestion that aging could impair a pilot's ability to 
update his/her menial model with new information, therefore, limiting the quality of 
performance (Morrow, Leirer, & Yesavage, 1990). 
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Not all research has demonstrated a clear or consistent age-linked deficit in 
memory. The literature reviewed gives contradictory results that may be attributed to 
methodological or design issues (e.g., cross-sectional versus longitudinal). 
Nevertheless, Hawkins (1987) concluded that the effect of aging on memory varies with 
the individual and it is difficult to draw generalizations from the data. Other research 
(e.g., Poon, 1985) has suggested that the degree of impairment in memory functions is 
highly related to the integrity of the biological system of the older adult. That is, the 
healthier the person, the less likely that person will experience memory problems. 
Supporting this, research over the last two decades has shown that intense physical 
conditioning can partially reverse some of the functional losses that typically accompany 
normal aging (Perlmutter et al., 1987). From this, one can reasonably suggest that the 
physiological improvements acquired from an active exercise program could also 
contribute to improvements in cognitive functioning as well. Thus, physical fitness may 
be an important factor to consider when evaluating the memory performance of older 
adults. Other factors to consider include practice and item familiarity. Poon noted that 
these are powerful variables in reducing age changes and improving the memory 
performance of older adults. Therefore, it is reasonable to speculate that these factors 
would put the pilot population, particularly well-practiced airline pilots, at a definite 
advantage compared to others within their age groups. 
Based on the available information, it is logical to infer that many cognitive 
processes greatly overlap. For example, Reese and Rodeheaver (1985) indicated that the 
memory often influences performance in situations intended to assess competence in other 
areas, such as problem solving. Although memory is not in itself a problem solving 
ability, it can in fact be an aid to problem solving. From this, we can safely infer that any 
variable(s) that interfere with memory (e.g., attention, intelligence) will likely interfere 
with problem solving abilities. As in other areas of cognitive performance and aging, 
most of the problem solving research is cross-sectional in nature. In addition, Shock et 
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al. (1984) noted that there have only been a few studies that have measured the changes in 
problem solving performance with age. One review (Arenberg, 1982) reported that these 
studies tend to show age differences with the older subjects performing less well than their 
younger counterparts. It is, however, recognized by gerontological investigators that age 
and birth cohorts (e.g., education, culture) arc confounded in cross-sectional studies. 
This implies that age differences revealed in many of these studies may in fact represent 
differences between cohorts rather than decrements due to age. 
Without a doubt, flying safe is a mentally demanding task. Pilots sometimes have 
to solve problems, divide time between difficult tasks, and exert a strong effort toward 
keeping mental control throughout the flight (Edwards, 1990). Reese and Rodeheaver 
(1985) reported that problem solving involves assessing the present state, defining the 
desired state, and finding ways to transform the former to the latter. It is interesting to 
note that Giambra and Arenberg (1980) suggested that there is a large class of problems 
that most individuals may not be able to solve until they have had extensive experience 
with such similar problems. A classic example is the Sioux City DC-10 accident, in 
which the aircraft lost all three hydraulic systems. There were no procedures in the 
emergency manual for such an event, so the 58 year old captain had to come up with a 
method of his own. The captain maintained the aircraft's directional stability by using 
differential thrust. He crash landed his crippled airplane, but his quick thinking and 
problem solving ability saved 186 lives (Stephens, 1989). 
Decision making, somewhat related to problem solving, refers to the evaluation of 
the possible solutions and selecting one to carry out. Salthouse (1990a) indicated that an 
essential requirement for pilots is their effectiveness in high-speed decision making. 
Some researchers perceive accidents as being related to decisions that bring about 
unfortunate or inappropriate responses (Sterns, Barrett, & Alexander, 1985). Reese and 
Rodeheaver (1985) noted that any differences observed in decision making or problem 
solving performance between elderly and young adults might reflect to a large extent 
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cohort differences that introduce confounding variables. 
Intelligence, like memory and attention, is not a unitary quality. It is often 
categorized into dimensions such as crystallized, fluid, psychometric, and general 
intelligence. Of particular importance to the flying environment is that of crystallized and 
fluid intelligence. Sterns, Oster, and Newport (1980) noted that crystallized intelligence is 
presumed to reflect prior learning and experience (e.g., vocabulary knowledge, general 
information); whereas, fluid intelligence, according to Salthouse (1990a), reflects the 
efficiency of current processing (e.g., tasks that emphasize speed or accuracy of 
associations, decisions, or responses). Intelligence overall is a vital and essential quality of 
a pilot for much of his/her successful behavior. Does intelligence decline in old age or does 
it remain unaffected as time passes by? In many cases, the results have been interpreted as 
contradictory (e.g., see Balles & Schaic, 1976; Horn & Donaldson, 1976). There are, 
however, some issues on which there seems to be a high level of agreement. For example, 
some crystallized intelligence abilities of healthy individuals can be expected to improve 
throughout life by increased or higher levels of education. On the other hand, fluid 
intelligence abilities are influenced by the physiological status of the individual; thus, any 
physiological degeneration will usually result in a decrement in fluid intellectual abilities. 
Horn and Donaldson have cautioned that decrements in intelligence, whether crystallized or 
fluid, are not inevitable in every person and arc not an inherent aspect of the aging process. 
The psychological literature on intelligence and aging over the past few decades 
has been dominated by a stereotypic view of decline (Baltcs & Schaie, 1976). 
Representative of this view, Botwinick (1977) noted that the decline in intellectual ability 
is clearly a part of advancing age. However, in one of his subsequent reports Botwinick 
(1978) suggested that the recent literature which focuses more on longitudinal research 
points to small declines in intelligence with age, and in some instances, no decline 
whatsoever. Similar results were reported by Horn and Donaldson (1976). After 
presenting a thorough review of the logical and empirical evidence, they suggested that 
some intelligence abilities (e.g., verbal comprehension, numerical skills) improve 
throughout most parts of adulthood, or at least do not decline as much or as early as other 
abilities. They concluded that perhaps some adults manage or learn to avoid decrements 
which affect others. Baltes and Schaie (1974) found that on many measures of 
vocabulary and skills reflecting educational experience, individuals seem to maintain their 
levels of functioning into their sixth and seventh decade without any noticeable losses. 
Whether or not aging per se alters intelligence is not an easy question to answer 
because of the many components of intellectual functioning and their differential 
relationships among one another. For example, the IOM (1981) report mentioned that an 
early decline in intelligence in active airline pilots (i.e., prior to 60 years of age) is very 
unlikely. Pilots as a group appear to have above average intelligence and there appears to 
be no correlation between age and intelligence. Another report (Labouvie-Vief, 1985) 
conducted an exhaustive literature review and found that most research on the cognitive 
capacities of aging adults is still performed using models that address themselves to youth 
rather than adulthood (e.g., testing techniques and measurement instruments). Other 
research (Schaie, 1974) supports the previous comment by suggesting that a presumed 
decline in intelligence with old adults is, at best, a methodological artifact. There appear 
to be large interindividual, cultural, and generational differences that are likely to 
influence test results. Labouvie-Vief concluded that cognitive abilities of older adults are 
inevitably interpreted with a regression-oriented bias. Some research (e.g., Horn & 
Donaldson, 1976) has suggested that our state of knowledge about intelligence and aging 
is not sufficient to permit authoritative assertions that there is, or that there is not, any 
intelligence decrement associated with aging. 
Other types of cognitive processing that are occupationally relevant to a pilot's job 
were also reported (Glanzer & Glaser, 1959; Mertens & Collins, 1985; Salthouse, 
Babcock, Skovronek, Mitchell, & Palmon, 1990). Salthouse et al. conducted three 
separate studies in order to investigate the effects of age and experience on spatial 
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visualization abilities among members of an occupation in which these abilities are in 
constant use (i.e., architects). Spatial visualization refers to the mental manipulation of 
spatial information (e.g., where another aircraft is or will be relative to your physical 
position and heading). The samples consisted of 107 men ranging in age from 21 to 78 
years. They found that increased age was associated with significantly lower levels of 
performance, even for those subjects with extensive spatial visualization experience. 
They concluded that their findings suggest that age-related changes on certain aspects of 
cognitive functioning may be independent of the amount of occupational experience. 
One of the very few studies that conducted research on pilots was done by
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Glanzer and Glaser (1959). They tested 544 subjects which were Air National Guard 
aircrewmen and/or commercial airline pilots between 20 and 50 years of age (mean age of 
31.8 years). The test battery consisted of 14 psychometric tests measuring job tasks 
critical to pilot performance (e.g., learning and remembering, interpreting spatial patterns, 
mathematical reasoning, numerical calculations and approximations). In eight of the 14 
tests, statistically significant age-related declines were observed on the basis of their 
cross-sectional data, even after flight experience was compensated for. However, the 
mathematical skills, which are very important to a pilot's job, did not show decrements 
with increased age. Other research (Mertens & Collins, 1985) examined various 
aviation-related tasks. They tested 30 healthy non-pilot subjects to determine the effects 
of stressors (e.g., sleep deprivation, altitude) on complex performance. A multiple-task 
battery was used to measure the performance of several flight-related tasks under varying 
workload conditions. The tasks included monitoring warning lights and meters, mental 
arithmetic, problem solving, target identification, and tracking. They found that the 
performance of older subjects (60-69 years old) was consistently lower than the younger 
subjects (30-39 years old) in all tasks. 
Although there arc many studies on aging in humans, Braune and Wickens (1984) 
suggested that since most of this research has not been conducted on pilots, the extent to 
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which these studies can be generalized to pilots may indeed be limited. The IOM (1981) 
report suggested that aging effects established for general population subjects may not 
apply to pilots, especially airline pilots who constantly exercise well-practiced skills. 
Gault (1991) found that from a pilot's point of view, the effects of aging are of more 
interest as compared to most other groups because of the occupation's exacting demands 
on individual abilities and capacities. Another finding (e.g., Rcinharl, 1982) indicated that 
most professional pilots are well informed about age-related changes and have a number 
of resources available to them so that they can educate themselves in health maintenance. 
In addition, some studies (e.g., Booze & Simcox, 1984; IOM; The Medical Study jproup, 
1988) found that pilots have demonstrated to be more physically fit than the general 
population at comparable ages, in addition to being better educated. Nevertheless, some 
physical components, perceptual capabilities, and sensory functions will deteriorate to a 
certain extent with increased age. 
The psychological literature reviewed suggests that age-related changes do occur in 
all individuals with advancing age, and some abilities relevant to pilot performance will 
inevitably deteriorate. However, it would be misleading to state that these age-related 
changes occur by age 60, especially in healthy professional pilots. In fact, many studies 
have indicated that great variations in individual capabilities and tolerances exist from person 
to person (Braune & Wickens, 1984; Gerathewohl, 1978b; IOM; Mohler, 1981; Shriver, 
1953; Szafran, 1969; The Medical Study Group; Tsang, 1989; Wentz, 1964). For example, 
a nonroutine event (e.g., loss of electrical power, in-flight fire) might be totally disabling to 
one person, but taken in stride by another. In summary, the psychological literature 
suggests that the status of the generally anticipated deficits in abilities associated with aging 
is left open to discussion, particularly with respect to healthy professional pilots. 
Regulatory Background 
The current procedures for regulatory control of this problem vary in the U.S., 
depending upon the type of flight operations. General aviation pilots can fly as long as 
they can maintain a current medical certificate appropriate for their type of flying duties. 
The same is true for commuter pilots, charter pilots, corporate pilots, and even the FAA's 
own pilots. However, regulatory control for airline pilots is more rigidly defined. At 60 
years of age airline pilots may no longer serve as PIC. Braune and Wickens (1983) 
suggested that it is assumed that chronologically younger individuals are more likely to 
perform better in such a demanding environment; thus, chronological age limits are 
imposed. This age regulation is the result of a combination of several difficult-to-define 
variables which are believed to lead to the anticipated deterioration of the skills necessary 
to fly an airliner at the safety level we have come to demand (Lavin, 1989). 
This anticipated deterioration of essential capabilities has been used to justify the 
age limitation for U.S. airline pilots. Three decades ago, the FAA mandated an upper age 
limit on all pilots of commercial airliners weighing more than 7500 lb and carrying more 
than 30 passenger seats. This regulation was issued on December 1,1959, and 
implemented on March 15,1960. It is commonly known as the Age 60 Rule and is 
administered by the U.S. government under Part 121.383(c) (Appendix A) of the Federal 
Aviation Regulations which prohibits individuals from serving as pilot or copilot of these 
commercial airliners upon reaching their 60th birthday (GAO, 1989). 
Part of the rationale asserted by the FAA to support this regulation was that the risk 
of heart attack, stroke, or sudden incapacitation sharply increased after age 60 and that no 
accurate scientific means of assessing risk on an individual basis then existed. The reports 
and research studies in which the FAA finalized their conclusions are dated from 1938 to 
1958. The studies were based on characteristics of the entire American adult male 
population, rather than on the healthier and better monitored pilot population (Select 
Committee on Aging, 1979). According to the GAO (1989), the FAA adopted the Age 60 
Rule because of the large increase in the number of older pilots and the potential effects that 
this might have on public safety in commercial air transportation. Although not a problem 
at the time, the FAA concluded that accidents among older pilots could become one. 
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The Age 60 Rule is not considered as a mandatory retirement policy by the FAA 
because it does not prohibit pilots from serving in other capacities. Upon reaching their 
60th birthday, pilots can contribute their knowledge and expertise by becoming flight 
instructors, check airmen, or flight engineers (Select Committee on Aging, 1985). Also, 
since this rule does not apply to the commuters (i.e., Part 135 scheduled operators), pilots 
60 and over can fly smaller aircraft that weigh less than 7,500 lb and have fewer than 30 
passenger seats (GAO, 1989). Why does this rule not apply to these pilots as well? No 
detailed explanation has ever been given for the underlying logic that allows other pilots to 
fly beyond age 60. One airline pilot (S. G. Broderick, personal communication, June 1, 
1990) contested that commuter pilots often fly "harder time" in less equipped aircraft, and 
often up to eight or nine legs per day. The National Institute on Aging (1981) 
recommended that the Age 60 Rule should be extended to all pilots, specifically commuter 
pilots. By its very nature, this rule has been extremely controversial. It has frequently 
been scrutinized in legal challenges, public hearings, and legislative actions. 
Other reports (e.g., Mohler, 1981; Mohler, 1986) found that our neighboring 
countries, Canada and Mexico, have no Federal upper age limit for commercial pilots. 
Mohler (1981) went on to note that in Great Britain, the upper age limitation of 60 years of 
age only applies to the captain. Additionally, Reinhart (1991) reported that British 
Airways requires their pilots to retire at 55; but just recently, the airline gave pilots the 
option to fly beyond 55 if they took additional tests. In light of this issue, several letters 
were written to foreign nations requesting the exact nature of their regulatory control for 
pilots. Many countries responded and a synopsis of the relevant statements is presented in 
Table 1. The actual letters are reproduced in Appendix B. 
There have been other proposed alternatives and procedures to this highly debated 
issue. One possible technical solution suggests involving more comprehensive medical and 
performance tests than are currently required (Boone, 1982; National Institute on Aging, 
1981; Office of Technology Assessment, 1990; Select Committee on Aging, 1979). 
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Table 1. Synopsis of Pilot Age Limits from Foreign Letter Responses 
Country 
Australia 
Finland 
Germany (G.D.R.) 
Mexico 
New Zealand 
Norway 
United Kingdom 
Summary 
Non-commercial operations — no upper age limit, provided that 
pilots satisfy the medical standards appropriate to the level of 
license held. 
Commercial and higher category license — no upper age limit, 
but restrictions placed upon pilots who have reached age 60. 
Those restrictions are: the aircraft must be equipped with dual 
controls and the operating crew includes another pilot who has 
not reached 60 years of age, and (a) if the pilot is <65 years of 
age, he/she must pass a flight test within the preceding 12 
months, and (b) if the pilot is ^65 years of age, he/she must 
pass a flight test within the previous 6 months. • 
Private Pilot License — no upper age limit. 
Commercial and Air Traffic Pilot license — upper age limit 
of 60. 
All pilots — no upper age limit; only criteria for terminating an 
aviator's career are the medical regulations. 
General Aviation Pilots — no upper age limit. 
Airline Pilots — agreement between airlines and pilots' union 
to retire at 60. 
All Pilots — no upper age limit. An aviator's career is 
terminated if he/she develops a medical condition for which a 
waiver cannot be issued. 
Private Pilot License — no upper age limit provided that the 
pilot satisfy the minimum flying hours per year and have valid 
medical papers, or have passed a biannual Periodic Flight 
Training (PFT) session. 
Commercial Pilot License — upper age limit of 60 for 
international flights. 
Private Pilot License — no upper age limit, but an increase in 
frequency of medical examinations with age (see Appendix B 
for details). 
Professional Pilot License — upper age limit of 60 with respect 
to Public Transport; however, pilots may continue as Public 
Transport pilots until age 65, provided they are a member of a 
two-pilot crew aircraft with a maximum total weight authorized 
not to exceed 20,000 kg (43,860 lb). 
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Recently, political solutions have been proposed. U.S. Representative James Lightfoot 
introduced a bill (H.R. 3498) to the House of Representatives to increase the current age 
limit from 60 to 65, and Iowa Senator Charles Grassley introduced an identical bill (S. 
2077) to the U.S. Senate (Cox, 1990). Both bills are currently on hold. See Appendix C 
for a copy of H.R. 3498. 
Background of the Age 60 Rule Controversy 
After the Age 60 Rule went into effect, the reaction from the airline industry was 
divided. Some aviation organizations supported the rule, while others called it 
discriminatory and strongly opposed it (GAO, 1989). Over the years, a number of pilots 
have legally challenged the FAA's policy of denying all requests for exemption from the 
Age 60 Rule. Recently, as noted in FAA Reopens (1989), the Federal Court of Appeals 
for the Seventh Circuit vacated exemption denials of 39 airline pilot petitioners. The 
court concluded: " . . . the FAA failed to set forth a sufficient factual or legal basis for 
the rejection of the petitioner's claim that older pilot's edge in experience offsets any 
detected physical losses" (p. 2). On October 31,1990 the Appeals Court affirmed the 
FAA's denial of exemptions in a 2-1 decision. According to an aviation attorney (A. M. 
Serwer, personal communication, November 27,1990), this permits the FAA to deny all 
exemption petitions to the Age 60 Rule. 
In order to establish a basis for revocation of the Age 60 Rule, the FAA held 
two public hearings, one in 1970 and the other in 1977. The Aerospace Medical 
Association and the Committee on Aerospace Medicine of the American Medical 
Association both supported the rule. Furthermore, the revocation request was denied 
at both hearings (GAO, 1989). It is believed that these organizations supported the rule 
because no other acceptable allernativc(s) that would offer equivalent protection to the 
American travelling public could be determined; and since our aviation system has 
operated effectively and safely within its bounds for the past 20 years, there seemed 
to be no need to change it. 
Some who once favored the Age 60 Rule are now starting to express some 
concern. Former president of the Aerospace Medical Association, Dr. George Kidera, 
who was on the panel that originally wrote the rule was more recently quoted in Dodson 
(1990): "We knew it was arbitrary, but we just couldn't accurately predict which pilots 
were likely to fall ill and which weren't. Now we can, so there's no reason not to let a 
qualified pilot fly beyond age 60" (p. 194). 
Pilots and other aviation enthusiasts have also challenged the Age 60 Rule by 
legislative means as well. In 1979, the House Select Committee on Aging, the House 
Subcommittee on Aviation, and the Committee on Public Works and Transportationjield 
hearings to determine the status of the rule. The GAO (1989) found that the result of those 
hearings was Public Law 96-171 (see Appendix D). Briefly, this law called upon the 
National Institutes of Health to conduct a study to determine whether or not mandatory 
retirement for certain pilots at age 60 or any other age was justified. The National Institute 
on Aging (1981) was assigned to the project, and their report concluded " . . . that there is 
no convincing medical evidence to support age 60, or any other specific age, for mandatory 
pilot retirement" (p. 2). However, the study also suggested that if the current age limit 
were increased, the probability of accidents would also increase. Unfortunately, the study 
did not make any projections regarding the magnitude of this increase in accidents, nor how 
the increase would compare to other younger groups of pilots. 
Exemption requests and challenges to the Age 60 Rule continue to occur. After 
reviewing several studies focused on gerontology, degenerative diseases, physiological 
and psychological changes, and the pilot population in comparison with the general 
population, the FAA concluded that there arc no alternatives that would ensure the same 
level of safety as that of the Age 60 Rule. According to the GAO (1989), the FAA argues 
that regardless of advances made in medical diagnosis and treatment, and in primary 
prevention techniques, the incidences of death and disability from degenerative diseases 
increase with age (see Figure 1). 
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Figure 1. Death and Disability Rates in Air Carrier Pilots and Flight Engineers 
From "Report of the National Institute on Aging Panel on the Experienced Pilots Study" 
by National Institute on Aging, 1981, p. 3. 
A. Pilot permanent groundings for medical reasons, U.S. air carrier. Letter communication, Walter A. Jensen, 
Vice President, Operations and Engineering, Air Transport Association of America, June 24 and July 16,1981. 
B. Flight engineer permanent groundings for medical reasons, same carrier as (A). Ixtter communication, 
Walter A. Jensen, Vice President, Operations and Engineering, Air Transport Association of America, 
June 24,1981. 
C. Medical retirements and deaths, U.S. air carrier. Orford, R. R. and Carter, E. T.,Aviation, Space and 
Environmental Medicine, 47(2): 180-184,1976. 
D. Deaths and permanent disabilities in flight crew holding ALP A Loss of License insurance. Kulak, L. L., 
Wick, R. L. and Billings, C. E.,Aerospace Medicine, 42(6): 670-672,1971. 
E. Pilot groundings, U.S. air carrier. Jensen, W. A. In: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Aviation, U.S. House 
of Representatives, concerning H.R. 3948, July 18-19,1979. 
The legal and political challenges of pilots1 wanting to fly as PIC beyond age 60 
and the defensive position of the FAA have polarized the issue. Both sides may be 
expected to selectively seek and report data supportive of their positions on the issue. 
Consequently, the need for an objective evaluation of the age-related issues and regulatory 
solutions is paramount, especially with the anticipated shortage of qualified pilots that has 
been forecasted, along with the projected growth of the U.S. commercial airline industry. 
Corroborating Reports of Age-Related Accidents 
There have been recent efforts to support the Age 60 Rule with age-related 
accident statistics. These supporting statistics come from a seven-year-old study wjjich 
covered accidents in general aviation from 1976 to 1980 (Golaszewski, 1983). General 
aviation entails the operations of U.S. civil aircraft owned and operated by persons, 
corporations, etc., other than those engaged in U.S. air carrier operations, like scheduled 
airliners or commercial operators of large aircraft (IOM, 1981). Koonce (1989) pointed 
out that this study suffers from a number of wSerious deficiencies. The study claims that 
as pilots age, there is an increase in the accident rate. The accident rate is commonly 
calculated as the number of accidents divided by 100,000 hours of recent flight time (i.e., 
annual flight time). The data used in Golaszcwski's study represented all pilots (Class I, 
II, and HI medical certificates) flying all types of aircraft, such as homebuilts, aircraft 
without copilots, and single-engine aircraft which may be less safe than commercial 
transport aircraft supported by large maintenance organizations. Golaszewskifs study 
has been under much scrutiny; however, he did indicate that his research was never 
intended to support the Age 60 Rule. It was a preliminary research project to learn 
something about how experience and age relate to accidents (Stephens, 1989). 
There have been other studies in the past that have looked at aviation accident 
statistics as a function of pilot age. Harper (1964) found that increasing age contributes 
significantly to accidents as well as to fatality rates. Harper also suggested that increasing 
age is closely associated with an increased risk of accidents. A similar report (Booze, 
1977) noted that several previous studies have indicated that age is repeatedly associated 
with an increased risk of general aviation accidents. Supporting this, Lategola, Fiorica, 
Booze, and Folk (1970) analyzed civil aviation accidents and found that with the exception 
of the 40-49 age group, the accident record (accidents per 10,000 airmen) increased with 
age. It should be noted that the accident record tells us nothing of the pilot's risk or 
exposure factor (e.g., how many hours flown or the number of takeoffs and landings per 
pilot). According to the National Institute on Aging (1981) report, exposure is perhaps 
the most important factor in aviation accident statistics. One other study (Office of 
Technology Assessment, 1990) found that pilots between 60-69 years of age who fceld 
first and second class medical certificates, had an accident rate twice as high as similar 
pilots in their 50s, but a lower rate than pilots between 20 and 39 years of age. 
On the other hand, Fotos (1988) reported that pilots in two age groups, between 
50-59, and over 60, experienced accident rates below the average. Likewise, Mohler et 
al. (1967) analyzed the accident records of older general aviation pilots, over 60, and 
concluded that the older group had an accident record essentially comparable, and in some 
cases superior to that of the younger pilot group. Another study (Mohler, 1983), found a 
decrease in the number of accidents with increasing age for pilots flying in general aviation 
who have earned commercial and air transport pilot (ATP) certificates. Mohler noted that 
higher age groups are consistently associated with lower accident records because the 
older pilots' performance reflects the effects of increasing experience and judgment. 
Supporting that statement, Charles Caudle, a witness in Select Committee on Aging 
(1979) stated, "Judgment, born of knowledge and tempered with experience, is the 
foundation of air safety" (p. 16). 
One of the more recent reports on pilot accident rates (Serwer, 1990) recalculated 
the data from the Flight Time Study (Golaszewski, 1983). Serwer found that by using the 
two highest experience categories in the study (>5,001 hours total flight time and >400 
hours recent flight time) the accident rate per 100,000 recent flight hours decreased with 
age, from 9.0 for the 20-29 year age group to 3.1 for the 60-69 year olds. These results 
are similar to the Office of Technology Assessment (1990) findings (i.e., pilots between 
60-69 years of age had a lower accident rate than those pilots between 20-39 years of age). 
From these results, one can reasonably say that each time an older pilot (i.e., 60-69 years 
old) is replaced by a younger pilot (i.e., between 20-39 years old) the safety level would 
decrease. Then why do we not let airline pilots fly until 65 or even 69 years of age? One 
could argue that the Age 60 Rule conflicts with the FAA's mandate to provide the highest 
standard of airline passenger safety, because safer pilots (60-69 years old) are being 
replaced by less safe pilots (30-39 years old). 
A letter from the Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA) to the FAA (1988) indicated 
that older pilots may have a lower accident rate than younger pilots. However, this may 
be due to their greater seniority rather than their greater experience, which gives the older 
pilots more freedom to choose their assignments. In making that choice, older pilots tend 
to bid on more desirable and possibly less strenuous or less demanding assignments, and 
often these trips provide the greatest number of flight hours. These trips can be argued to 
be inherently less risky because there are fewer takeoffs and landings; and it is in these 
two critical stages of flight that two-thirds of aviation accidents occur. In contrast, others 
argue that while the older pilots fly the longer trips, they land their aircraft after 10-12 
hours of flight, when fatigue is likely to produce some undesirable effects. 
It has been shown that many studies have calculated accident rales and safety 
levels with general aviation data, but to this researcher's knowledge not one has focused 
specifically on airline operations. Why? The problem lies in acquiring the appropriate 
data. According to the FAA's Forecast Branch (G. Mercer, personal communication, July 
26, 1990), most of the necessary data (e.g., airline pilot flight hour distribution and the 
number of takeoffs and landings as a function of pilot age) have not been captured 
anywhere. Additionally, Foushee and Helmrcich (1988) stated,"... since accidents are 
so infrequent, they make terrible research criteria forjudging crew performance" (p. 218). 
A similar observation was made in Baker et al. v. FAA (1989). It was suggested that 
because of the extremely small number of accidents in commercial airline operations, there 
is simply no purpose for, nor are there data available for a broad scale statistical study of 
airline accidents and age. 
It is obvious that the literature gives a number of mixed results. Some studies 
support the hypothesis of a decrease in safely with advancing age, while others report 
opposite findings. Koonce (1989) revealed that by utilizing different methodologies, one 
can get very different results. Koonce showed that differing viewpoints can be obtained 
from the same data, it all depends upon the goal of the researcher(s). 
Experience 
It has been suggested (Salthouse, 1987) that experience is a very important variable 
moderating human performance and one that should be considered when attempting to 
examine any type of individual differences in behavior. Salthouse noted lhat research in 
the past has convincingly demonstrated that adults of all ages benefit from experience. In a 
recent court case (Baker et al. v. FAA, 1989) it was postulated that in aviation, pilot 
experience enhances safety. One study on aviators (Shriver, 1953) noted lhat experience 
is undoubtedly a major factor leading to greater effectiveness in emergencies. Similar 
remarks were reported in Baker et al. v. FAA which cited airline industry experts 
indicating that even the best training is not always an adequate substitute for years of 
experience in the most demanding cockpit situations, especially those requiring knowledge 
and proficiency to handle an emergency. Furthermore, Dodson (1990) quoted former 
FAA administrator Donald D. Engen stating: "Training is important, but when everything 
turns to worms, experience is what counts" (p. 190). 
Many things can improve with age when they are practiced often enough, 
particularly judgment. According to Edwards (1990), the prevalent opinion is that 
judgment only comes from experience. One can be taught procedures, motor skills, 
principles, and perhaps emotional control, but judgment comes only from performing 
tasks, experiencing the results and modifying the performance in future similar situations. 
One report, (Mohler, 1981) referring specifically to airline pilots, noted that experience 
enhances judgment, and that older healthy persons tend to be less impulsive, and 
consequently have better safety records. Does this suggest that age-related changes 
disappear with older individuals who have had extensive experience with such relevant 
activities? In light of this question, Morrow et al. (1990) noted that since older pilots 
usually have more flight experience, any age-related declines in motor and cognitive 
functions would most likely be offset by their invaluable flight experience. 
It is generally felt throughout the industry that experience, whether general pr 
specific, yields a variety of benefits. Many skills, particularly those required in today's 
complex airliners, are practiced over the years for hundreds and even thousands of hours, 
and such experience may lead to improvements in the efficiency and effectiveness of 
performance. Sterns et al. (1985) studied various kinds of accidents (e.g., mining, 
transportation, construction, manufacturing) and how they relate to aging individuals. 
They stated, "Older adults may maintain many highly practiced activities at a constant level 
even though they are subjected to age-related declines; in short, experience compensates 
for their loss in ability" (p. 720). Other similar remarks were made by Salthouse (1990b), 
who concluded that somehow increased levels of experience lead to a compensation for 
declining abilities. Although these reports suggest that increased experience reduces the 
magnitude of age-related changes, Salthouse (1990a) observed that the empirical basis for 
this position has not been explicitly confirmed. 
Despite its importance, the effects of experience arc subject to limitations. 
Salthouse (1987) asserted that there is an upper threshold level of experience relevant to 
performance. Once that threshold is exceeded, further increments in experience do not 
necessarily contribute to increases in performance. For example, a letter from the staff 
counsel for ALPA was cited by the FAA in Baker et al v. FAA (1989): ALPA theorized 
that once a pilot acquires 5,000 hours of flight time, the law of diminishing returns comes 
into play; i.e., any additional flight time does not necessarily improve that pilots 
performance from a safety standpoint. Although this implication derived by ALPA was 
based on Golaszewski's (1983) Flight Time Study, it was not supported by any data. 
Relating flying time to experience also presents some philosophical problems; e.g., 
does a pilot have 10,000 hours of experience, or 10 hours of experience 1,000 times? 
Shriver (1953) studied the effects of aging and experience on aircrew performance. After 
interviewing 556 military aircrewmen (with a mean age of 29.5 and a mean number of 
1,800 flying hours), Shriver noted that at some point in an aviator's career, a peak appears 
to be reached, after which performance begins to deteriorate. From this, Shriver 
hypothesized that this deterioration in performance may be due to both physical and 
motivational changes outweighing the positive effects of experience. In addition, Reinhart 
(1991) reported that we like to think that we are just as good as we once were in the good 
old days of our youth; in many ways, with our years of experience, we are, but not as 
good in others. 
It has also been suggested (Edwards, 1990) that experience does not always leach 
correctly. For example, as pilots become more experienced, they do not necessarily 
become better at making decisions in all situations. They are able to make routine decisions 
more effectively because of the countless number of limes such similar situations have 
arisen. Edwards added that sometimes decisions are made that work out well, but they 
were made for the wrong reasons (i.e., not all errors result in accidents). Consequently, 
the most experienced pilots may sometimes be led to make less effcclivc decisions in 
infrequently occurring situations than equally well-informed novices. But, this lends to be 
the exception, and it is generally accepted and supported by the available data that 
experience contributes to better performance in most tasks and is overall beneficial. 
Salthouse (1990a) noted that most of the studies designed to examine interrelations 
of age and experience seem to have implicitly utilized either a maintenance (i.e., 
experience preserves abilities lhat would otherwise decline) or a remediation (i.e., added 
experience reverses ability declines) interpretation of the role of experience. Salthouse 
reported that because the currently available evidence is ambiguous, there is a substantial 
opportunity for one's biases and prejudices to influence the nature of the conclusion 
regarding the possibility that experience minimizes age-related changes. Furthermore, the 
existing literature is still too uncertain to support firm convictions about whether age 
differences on familiar activities are smaller than those on new or unfamiliar activities, 
whether age differences can be lessened or eliminated with extensive experience, or 
whether performance differences at different ages are absent on continuously practiced 
activities associated with one's occupation. 
Other Relevant Issues 
The present aviation system is not flawless by any means. Pilot error remains the 
single greatest contributing cause of aircraft accidcnls. In the interest of safety, we must 
always look for ways to improve or supplement our current aviation system. The Age 60 
Rule is intended to be part of the margin of safely that is built into the system to reduce the 
probability of accidents. Dodson (1990) quoted a National Transportation Safety Board 
(NTSB) official who said, "Young pilots used to learn the ropes as flight engineers. 
Now, with two-man cockpits, we're putting them directly into the co-pilot's seat, and that 
might erode a margin of safety" (p. 190). In addition to eliminating the experience gained 
as a flight engineer prior to moving into the co-pilot's seat, the anticipated pilot shortage in 
combination with the Age 60 Rule may be moving co-pilots into the captain's seat at an 
earlier point in their careers. This double loss of experience may cause the Age 60 Rule to 
be counterproductive. Thus, do we increase the likelihood of accidcnls by retiring some 
of our most seasoned and experienced pilots and replacing them with younger less 
experienced pilots? 
The FAA has major concerns about the probability of sudden incapacitation and 
the relative inability of physicals and check rides to detect deterioration in pilot skills. The 
IOM (1981) report described sudden incapacitation as an immediate loss of consciousness 
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without prior symptoms and results in the pilot's inability to control the aircraft, whether 
due to physiological or psychological reasons. The IOM also noted in their report that 
sudden incapacitation is a serious, but rare event among pilots. 
Other literature (Bennett, 1972; Booze, 1987; Buley, 1969; Froom, Benbassat, 
Gross, Ribak, & Lewis, 1988; Mohler & Booze, 1978; Office of Technology 
Assessment, 1990; Rayman, 1973; Reighard & Mohler, 1967) has also cited pilot 
incapacitations as infrequent events. Mohler and Booze found that general aviation 
accidents due to sudden incapacitation are less than 1% of all documented fatal general 
aviation accidents. Buley studied airline pilot inflight incapacitations and found that#in 
cases resulting in accidents, the average pilot age was 46 years old, and in cases not 
resulting in accidents, the average pilot age was 44 years old. In addition, Bennett found 
that a vast majority of inflight incapacitations are not age-related. Bennett reported that a 
large number of these incidents are related to food poisoning. The incapacitations by 
decreasing order of frequency are: nausea and vomiting associated with gastrointestinal 
upset, diarrhea, ear problems, faintness, headaches, and vertigo. However, despite the 
rarity of these events, there is still the possibility of such a classic case. Reighard and 
Mohler cited the catastrophic Lockheed Electra accident from 1966 as an example in which 
the captain, who was 59 years old, became incapacitated silently during a circling 
approach in instrument conditions and 83 occupants lost their lives. 
Many pilots believe that special medical waivers arc the only answer to this complex 
issue. The FAA may grant waivers if it is shown lhat a balanced level of safety will be 
provided when the waiver is granted (Glines, 1985). According to the GAO (1989) report, 
challengers of the rule allege that the FAA has been inconsistent in granting exemptions 
from certain medical requirements, but not from the Age 60 Rule (see Table 2). Bruce and 
Fisher (1987) argued since the FAA grants special issuances to those pilots under 60 years 
of age who are medically qualified despite prior myocardial infarction or bypass surgery, 
they should also be able to grant special issuances for pilots over 60 who are healthy and at 
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Table 2. Special Issuances Granted to Applicants for Class I Medical Certificates 
Medical condition 
Valve replacements 
Pacemaker 
1 Coronary artery bypass 
1 surgery/coronary 
artery disease 
1 Angioplasty 
1 Myocardial infarction 
1 (w/no bypass surgery) 
1 Neurological3 
1 Psychiatric0 
1 Drug dependence 
1 Alcoholism 
1 Diabetes 
Total 
1 aNeurological includes carotid 
1 and convulsive reactions. 
1 DPsychiatric includes schizoph 
1 disorders. 
1982 
0 
0 
9 
0 
1 
2 
1 
0 
37 
0 
50 
Number of! 
1983 
0 
0 
2 
2 
2 
2 
1 
1 
73 
0 
83 
1984 
0 
0 
3 
3 
3 
6 
0 
0 
81 
0 
96 
special issuances granted 
1985 
2 
0 
36 
7 
17 
6 
3 
3 
90 
1 
165 
1986 
3 
1 
26 
10 
14 
10 
2 
3 
87 
0 
156 
artery conditions, stroke, disturbance of 
renia, paranoid states, psychoses 
1987 
5 
0 
15 
9 
20 
6 
3 
0 
88 
0 
146 
1988 
2 
0 
20 
16 
14 
2 
• o 
8 
79 2 
143 
consciousness, 
, and personality 
Source: FAA, Civil Aeromedical Institute, Oklahoma City. 
Note. From "Aviation Safely: Information of FAA's Age 60 Rule for Pilots" by General 
Accounting Office (GAO), 1989, p. 16. 
low risk for coronary events. It should also be recognized that these waivers are limited 
and only affect a small minority of pilots. On the other hand, the Age 60 Rule affects all 
pilots, and if one waiver is given, others will begin applying for the exemption. Some 
pilots feel that there would be too much surveillance of the pilots over 60 by both the FAA 
and by individual airlines, and this would burden the whole system (Hammond, 1989). 
However, one aviation attorney (A. M. Serwer, personal communication, January 17, 
1991) speculated that a large proportion of airline pilots would like to retire at age 60. In 
light of this question, Reinhart (1991) conducted a survey on what individual pilots think 
of the Age 60 Rule. Reinhart found that 74% of the 250 responses indicated that thgy 
would accept additional and more extensive evaluations in order to fly beyond age 60. 
However, from the total survey results he concluded that there is not a convincing majority 
of pilots who want to continuing flying beyond age 60. 
Some research (Downey & Dark, 1990; Mohler, 1984) found that during recent 
years, advances in aviation medicine and changes in FAA policies and procedures have 
resulted in the medical certification of pilots who, in earlier years, would have been 
denied. Many pilots claim that they do not understand the logic of the FAA's policy 
toward waivers. The FAA's application of medical knowledge to recertify these pilots 
with serious medical disorders demonstrates that the agency has the power and is willing 
to individualize its medical considerations and base judgments on the latest developments 
in medicine and pilot proficiency assessments. However, an FAA official indicated that 
medical exemptions are granted for single, specific problems, and that the Age 60 Rule is 
not a single-problem issue ("Federal Rule," 1989). 
The Office of Technology Assessment (1990) indicated that the incidence of 
medical illnesses that may impair pilot performance increases with age. Supporting this, 
comprehensive data of airline pilots who were denied medical certification was analyzed 
by Downey and Dark (1990). They found that age-specific denial rates increase with age. 
The annual denial rate for first class medical certificates was found to be 4.3 per 1,000 
active airline pilots, increasing from 1.0 per 1,000 in the 25-29 age group to 16.2 per 
1,000 in the 55-59 age group (see Table 3). This demonstrates that the physical exams are 
detecting deterioration with age and eliminating those pilots who fall below the standard 
Table 3. First Class Medical Denials (Airline Pilots) 
Age 
Groups 
25-29 
30-34 
35-39 
40-44 
45-49 
50-54 
55-59 
TOTAL 
Active 
Airline 
Pilots 
5,698 
8,809 
10,005 
9,544 
10,288 
7,760 
3,576 
55,680 
Percent 
of 
Active 
Airline 
Pilots 
10.2 
15.8 
18 
17.2 
18.5 
13.9 
6.4 
100 
Denied 
Airline 
Pilots 
7 
16 
20 
52 
115 
150 
116 
476 
Percent of 
Total 
Denials 
1.5 
3.4 
4.2 
10.9 
24.1 
31.5 
24.4 
100 
Annual 
Age-
Specific 
Denial 
Rate* 
1 . 
1 
1 
2.7 
5.6 
9.7 
16.2 
4.3 
•Annual rates per 1,000 active airline pilots. 
Note. Adapted from "Medically Disqualified Airline Pilots in Calender Years 1987 and 1988" 
by L. E. Downey and S. J. Dark, 1990, DOT/FAA/AM-90/5, p. 3. 
established for safety. However, one must interpret this data with caution because 
there may be other factors contributing to this sharp increase in medical denials with age 
(e.g., economic status of the airline, management/union disagreements); this also suggests 
that there may be other reasons for a pilot to retire early prior to age 60 (e.g., income 
tax advantage). 
The retirements mandated by the Age 60 Rule may have possibly contributed to the 
loss of our most experienced pilots, and could be forcing the airlines to lower their 
standards and hire less qualified pilots. Moorman (1986) found that the amount of jet-
flying time required by airlines for new hirees has dropped from 2,300 hours in 1983, to 
1,600 in 1984, and to 800 in 1985. New hirees are not of course, employed immediately 
as PIC. They often spend years in the flight engineers1 seats flying sideways before they 
even get a chance to touch the controls. According to an airline captain (E. Soliday, 
personal communication, September 25, 1990), it takes a new hiree roughly 11 years for 
promotion to the left seat (i.e., at the time of this conversation). But that number varies 
from year to year and from airline to airline due to hiring trends. One must keep in mind, 
however, that the nature of this progression is changing. For example, new automated 
commercial airliners (e.g., MD-11, B-747-400) only require two pilots, rather than three. 
This means that new hirees of tomorrow will be hired as first officers (i.e., copilots#with 
hands on the flight controls) rather than as flight engineers silting sideways in the back. 
It should be apparent that the Age 60 Rule is a very complex issue with many 
confounding details. The arguments presented by both sides (i.e., supporters and 
petitioners) are undoubtedly legitimate concerns. Many issues concerning the effects of 
age and experience on flight safety were identified in this study, and the major points are 
as follows: 
1. Physiological and psychological changes do occur in all individuals with 
advancing age, and these changes are likely to influence the performance of 
complex tasks and critical skills. 
2. Many of the studies reviewed on human performance and aging suggest 
progressive declines with increasing age; however, it can be argued that most of 
these age-related changes are attributed to one's lifestyle rather than age itself. 
3. The recertification of many special issuances suggests that the FAA has the 
knowledge and is willing to individualize the current medical standards. If recent 
advances in aviation medicine can accurately predict which pilots are likely to 
become ill and which are not, then healthy professional pilots should be allowed to 
fly beyond age 60. Although, even if the FAA and the airlines allow pilots to fly 
beyond 60, it cannot be said for certain that safety will be enhanced. 
4. Professional pilots are likely to be more aware of and may be more cautious to 
these age-related changes because these changes could easily affect their livelihood. 
Reinhart (1982) noted that most professional pilots are well informed and have a 
number of resources available to them so that they can educate themselves in health 
maintenance. 
5. Years of experience in the cockpit may compensate for or reduce the magnitude 
of age-related changes, especially when older pilots maintain their proficiency; thus 
making them at least equal to if not better than their younger counterparts. 
6. Since older pilots generally have more seniority, they tend to bid on more 
desirable and possibly less strenuous or less demanding assignments. These trips 
can be argued to be inherently less risky because there are fewer takeoffs and* 
landings, thus reducing their risk factor. 
7. The current practice of putting new hirees directly into the right seat is also an 
area of concern because these new pilots are not getting the valuable experience as 
they would if they were flight engineers. The anticipated pilot shortage in 
combination with the Age 60 Rule may be moving these new co-pilots into the 
captain's seat at a much earlier point in their careers. This double loss of experience 
may cause the Age 60 Rule to be counterproductive. 
Statement of the Hypothesis 
Many feel that in older pilots, flight experience, knowledge, and judgment is 
irreplaceable and that these unique qualities may offset potential health risks. 
Consequently, the null hypothesis states that aging has no measurable effect on pilot 
performance as inferred from the observed-over-expected number of accidents among 
pilots; the alternative hypothesis argues that pilot performance deteriorates with age as 
inferred from a greater number of observed-over-expected accidents among older pilots. 
METHOD 
Data Types and Sources 
The data for this study came from records of general aviation accidents (i.e., 
private pilots, commercial pilots, and ATPs), and airline accidents (Part 121). An aircraft 
accident, as defined by the NTSB, is an event involving substantial or greater damage to 
the airplane and/or serious or greater injury to an occupant of that aircraft. The most 
available data providing an accurate indication of our past and current aviation accident 
trends are contained in a number of separately maintained data banks. These data were 
acquired from the following specialized aviation data banks: 
1. The NTSB's Accident Data Division compiled an accident data search with the 
following broad categories: accidents from 1982-1988 for general aviation pilots, 
commercial pilots, ATPs, and airline pilots. These categories contain the following data 
elements: age of the PIC; commercial, ATP, and airline accidents in which "pilot error" 
was the determined cause of the accident. 
2. The Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association (AOPA) Air Safety Database 
provided the number of general aviation accidents that occurred between 1982-1988 
independent of cause and the number of accidents in which "pilot error" was the determined 
cause of the accident. The Director of the AOPA Air Safety Database (J. Carson, personal 
communication, December 5,1990) indicated that the AOPA has a special staff that 
re-evaluates the NTSB accident reports and classifies them as pilot caused rather than pilot 
error. The accidents were also separated by the type of license held (e.g., private pilot 
only, commercial and/or ATP). It should be noted that the pilot error accidents were used 
because they are a definite indicator of inadequate performance that could possibly be 
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associated with the aging process. It has been recognized that performance failures appear 
to be more closely related to pilot safety and proficiency than health or medical disabilities 
in flight (Gerathewohl, 1978b). 
3. The FAA's Statistical Handbook on Aviation provided the distribution of pilots 
by age and by type of license held (i.e., private, commercial, and air transport). All data 
were for the years 1982 to 1988. 
4. The FAA's Aeromedical Certification Statistical Handbook provided the 
distribution of airline pilots by age from 1982-1988. The Handbook stated that airline 
pilots were determined by the combination of Class I medical certificate issuance dicing 
the preceding 13 months and an occupation of "pilot for an airline" (see Table 4). Note 
that Table 4 accounts for pilots age 60 and over who claim to be airline pilots. 
However, the Age 60 Rule prohibits these pilots from operating as PIC (i.e., under Part 
121 regulations); therefore, it was assumed that these pilots age 60 and over represent 
those who fly commuter aircraft and/or those who choose to be flight engineers for the 
airlines rather than retiring at age 60. Airline pilots are also referred to as Part 121 
operators in this study. 
5. The COMSIS Research Corporation provided the flight hour distribution for 
Class I, II, and HI medical certificate holders in five-year age groups (e.g., 20-24, 
25-29, 30-34) for 1982-1988 as compiled from FAA pilot medical records. 
The data were stratified into categories according to the age of the PIC 
responsible for the accident. The categories were grouped into five-year increments 
starting at 20-24, and ending with 55-59. With reference to the airline data, the age 
groups begin with 25-29 but end with 55-59, since they are the closest to the age limits 
set by Part 61.151 and 121.383(c) for pilots holding an ATP rating and engaging in air 
carrier operations (Downey & Dark, 1990). There is, however, no upper age limit set 
for ATPs (i.e., an ATP can exercise his/her privileges as long as he/she can maintain the 
appropriate medical certificate). 
Table 4. Age Distribution of Airline Pilots* (As of December 31, of that year) 
Age Group 
20-24 
25-29 
30-34 
35-39 
40-44 
45-49 
50-54 
55-59 
Subtotal 
60-64 
65-69 
Total 
| Avg. Age 
1982 
703 
2,920 
5,698 
6,165 
7,590 
7,119 
4,269 
3,076 
37,540 
167 
18 
37,725 
41.5 
1983 
775 
3,018 
5,435 
6,082 
7,541 
7,436 
4,843 
2,807 
37,937 
159 
17 
38,113 
41.6 
1984 
866 
3,365 
5,716 
7,022 
7,738 
8,088 
5,501 
2,698 
40,994 
159 
21 
41,174 
41.5 
1985 
1,164 
4,850 
7,050 
8,801 
8,645 
9,306 
6,478 
2,935 
49,229 
217 
43 
49,489 
41.0 
1986 
1,159 
5,286 
7,828 
9,752 
8,959 
9,928 
7,205 
3,191 
53,308 
232 
65 
53,605 
41.0 
1987 
1,036 
5,698 
8,809 
10,005 
9,544 
10,288 
7,760 
3,576 
56,716 
206 
47 
56,969 
41.0 
1988 
990 
5,663 
9,499 
10,006 
9,709 
10,543 
8,097 
4,123 
58,630 
229 
62 
58,921 
41.2 
1989 1 
1,047 
6,067 
11,067 
10,459 
10,816 
10,486 
8,915 
4,772 
63,629 
241 
70 
63,940 
43.1 J 
* Airline Pilots were determined by the combination of first class medical certificate issuance during the 
preceding 13 months and an occupation of "pilot for an airline". 
Note. From "Aeromedical Certification Statistical Handbook" by Civil Aeromedical Institute (CAMI), Aeromedical Certification 
Division, Statistics and Records Branch. 
The data used for the analysis are the most current and reliable available. 
Professionally trained investigators often spend months using state-of-the-art scientific 
techniques to determine the primary cause of an accident, along with other essential 
information. According to Westrum (1987), aircraft accident investigation has now 
become a small branch of applied science or engineering, and these investigation 
procedures are more thorough than those of other transportation modes. 
Design 
The design of this study consisted of collecting aviation accident data containing 
pilot age and experience information from all available sources between 1982 and 1988. 
In order to analyze the data accurately and efficiently, the data were organized into tables 
and graphs. The accidents were analyzed in terms of: (a) the number of observed 
accidents versus the number of expected accidents; (b) the accident record; (c) the accident 
rate; and (d) the percentage of accidents classified as pilot error. The data were examined 
to determine whether there were any trends across age groups and to verify any significant 
differences between the different age groups. 
The number of expected accidents was calculated by multiplying the proportion of 
pilots in an age group by the total number of accidents observed for all age groups. 
Accident records were calculated by dividing the number of accidents per age group by the 
number of pilots in that age group (e.g., accidents per 1,000 active pilots). The accident 
rates were calculated by dividing the number of accidents per age group by the number of 
hours flown by pilots in that age group, and were evaluated by using a common metric 
(e.g., accidents per 100,000 annual flight hours). The percentage of accidents classified 
as pilot error were calculated by dividing the number of "pilot error" accidents per age 
group by the total number of accidents in that age group. The observed-ovcr-expected 
frequencies, accident records, accident rates, and percentage levels were studied for the 
various age groups. 
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This design is comparable to, but sought to avoid the bias that critics have 
identified in Golaszewski's (1983) study. His study included non-general aviation 
flight time, or air carrier hours in the accident rate equation (approximately 93 million 
hours) which depressed the accident rate for pilots under age 60, but not so for pilots 
age 60 and over. However, Golaszewski did recognize this as a potential discrepancy in 
his study. The primary goal of this study was to keep the data as homogeneous as 
possible; i.e., to keep Class III hours with private pilots, Class II hours with 
commercial pilots, and Class I hours with ATPs and airline pilots. 
The reader should be familiar with the different details involved in each class of 
medical certificate. For example, Class HI operators are usually private and student pilots; 
this class must have a physical examination every two years. Class II operators are 
usually commercial pilots; this class must have a physical examination every year. Class I 
operators are typically ATPs and/or airline pilots; this class must have a physical 
examination every six months. However, it should be made clear that this does not 
necessarily mean that all private pilots have only Class III medicals, nor does it mean that 
all commercial pilots have only Class II medicals, and the same goes for ATPs and airline 
pilots with respect to Class I medicals. These were just assumptions, and the limitations 
of these assumptions are discussed in a subsequent part of this study. 
Procedure 
The relevant information from all of the available databases was assembled into a 
common format which assisted the evaluation. Most of the data were obtained from 1982 
to 1988 records. The data were categorized by age groups into a database on a personal 
computer. The categories include: pilot age groups in five-year intervals starting at 20-
24, and up to 55-59; total number of active private pilots; total number of active 
commercial pilots; total number of active ATPs; total number of active U.S. airline pilots; 
number of accidents observed for a specified year by age group; number of accidents 
expected for a specified year by age group; the accident record; and the accident rate. 
The term active is a minimal definition used by the FAA and refers to more than zero 
flight hours per year. 
Limitations 
There are some limitations in this study that need to be recognized. Some 
assumptions were made that need to be identified. An assumption, according to Gay 
(1987), is an important fad presumed to be true but not actually verified. The first 
assumption pertains to the reported flight hour data (i.e., the COMSIS data), in which it 
was assumed that all pilots accurately report their recent and total time when taking their 
flight physical, and when reporting information in an accident investigation. According 
to Golaszewski (1983), it is believed that most pilots do not take their logbooks with 
them to flight physicals; therefore, they report their recent and total time from memory. 
On the other hand, it is believed that the flight hours reported in accident investigations 
may be more precise because of the formal nature of the investigative process. Without 
the original pilot logbook, there is no practical means of testing the accuracy of the 
reported flight time. Nevertheless, it is presumed that these inaccuracies are random 
and will not significantly alter the results. 
Another assumption was made in reference to the "pilot error" data. Some critics 
may argue that pilot error was the determined cause because no other relevant cause was 
found. This position has received some support in the literature; for example, Edwards 
(1990) suggested that pilot error is often listed as the cause of the accident because there is 
neither time nor money available for thorough investigations. These suggestions may be 
true to some extent, but by and large, it is assumed that they represent only a small portion 
of the total number of pilot error accidents. 
The last assumption made in this study came about by utilizing the flight hour data 
(i.e., hours flown by medical class holders). In regards to general aviation, it is true that 
not every general aviation pilot holds a Class III certificate. In fact, some general aviation 
pilots are Class I holders (e.g., airline captains) who often go flying for pleasure. 
Furthermore, not all airline pilots are Class I holders (see Table 5). The captain is the 
only one required to possess a Class I medical in an airline cockpit It is assumed that 
most co-pilots (or first officers) get the Class I medical, especially the new hirees because 
it is normally required, but then let the medical downgrade to a Class II after six months, 
so they do not have to make another trip to the Medical Examiner's office. This is not 
only convenient, but also saves the pilot some money. Lastly, many of the hours 
acquired by medical class holders (particularly Class I and Class II) are not actually 
hands-on flight hours. These hours are logged by flight engineers who often "fly 
sideways" in the back never touching the primary flight controls. 
Cross-sectional Constraints 
Many studies discuss the limitations of cross-sectional studies (e.g., Hartley, 
Harker & Walsh, 1980; Horn & Donaldson, 1976; Reese & Rodeheaver, 1985; Shock et 
al., 1984; Willis & Baltes, 1980). Reese and Rodeheaver concluded that the apparent 
cognitive regression in old age may be an artifact of the exclusive use of cross-sectional 
methods. Differences in results (e.g., accident statistics) cannot be definitely interpreted 
as deficits in competence or a decline in abilities. Willis and Baltes indicated that in a strict 
sense, the cross-sectional method is never an appropriate substitute for longitudinal 
investigation. The cross-sectional method is characterized by measurements made at 
approximately the same time on a large number of subjects covering the entire adult age 
span. Age changes are not measured directly but are inferred from the differences in mean 
values observed in different age groups. Only average differences between age groups are 
identified. The primary advantage of the cross-sectional method is that the presence of age 
trends in a group of subjects can be detected fairly quickly. Caution is necessary in its 
interpretation, however, since differences between age groups include both birth cohorts 
as well as age effects. 
Horn and Donaldson (1976) indicated that it is well known that in cross-sectional 
analyses, differences between generations (e.g., level of formal education, training 
Table 5. Number of Pilots by Type of License and Class of Medical Certificate (1982-1988) 
1 No. of Private Pilolsb 
No. of Third Class 
Holders0 
No. of Commercial 
Pilotsb 
No. of Second Class 
Holders0 
No. of ATPsb 
No. of Airline Pilots^ 
No. of Firsl Class 
1 Holders0 
20-24 
169,345 
157,930 
64,279 
53,956 
3,757 
6,693 
20,486 
25-29 
254,111 
215,035 
125,102 
73,015 
43,706 
30,800 
48,948 
30-34 
315,427 
245,900 
123,822 
82,490 
86,841 
50,035 
63,224 
35-39 
322,102 
243,138 
155,909 
102,094 
107,338 
57,833 
69,877 
40-44 
284,601 
216,215 
163,408 
95,195 
101,536 
59,726 
71,757 
45-49 
228,723 
177,783 
129,367 
74,374 
89,229 
62,708 
70,652 
50-54 
201,167 
159,571 
103,509 
62,079 
69.930 
44,153 
53,099 
55-59 
181,523 
118,827 
76,440 
40,178 
42,884 
22,406 
24,117 
60-64a 
194,079 
122,561 
123,292 
49,478 
41,561 
1,369 
11,158 
| 65-69 
-
47,545 
-
19,950 
-
273 
1,548 
| Total | 
2,151,078 
1,704,505 
1,065,128 
652,809 
586,782 
335,996 
434,866 
*The FAA's Statistical Handbook on Aviation lists the upper age group for all pilots as 60+. 
^Source: FAA's Statistical Handbook on Aviation. 
cSource: COMSIS Research Corporation data for "active" medical holders (Le., more than zero flight hours per year). 
^Source: CAMFs Aeromedical Certification Statistical Handbook. 
techniques, technology) are confounded with age changes within individuals. Cultural 
changes (e.g., communication techniques) can occur in a decade or so, and technological 
changes which may also influence performance can occur almost overnight. The 
technological issue raises another question as to whether or not transitioning from an 
older aircraft (e.g., DC-9, B-727) to a new state-of-the-art airliner (e.g., the highly 
automatized B-767) represents a problem for the older generations1 transitioning, because 
of the advanced computers that virtually fly the airplanes by themselves. However, 
Mohler (1981) strongly suggested that there is no evidence that older pilots have more 
trouble transitioning to new aircraft than younger pilots. 
ANALYSIS 
The data were separated into categories for the evaluation (e.g., Class HI hours 
were kept with private pilots, Class II hours were kept with commercial pilots, and Class I 
hours were kept with ATPs). In regards to the accident statistics, an age-related trend is 
noticeable in a majority of the figures. This trend shows a decrease in accident statistics 
with increasing age, reaching minimum values between 40-49 years of age, and then 
increasing slightly through the 50s. 
The data in the following figures represent calculated totals of pilot flight time, 
number of accidents, and number of active pilots as acquired from the specified aviation 
data banks. The source data are presented in Appendix E. Figure 2 represents the annual 
flight hours per pilot by class of medical certificate. The annual hours flown for first class 
holders reach a peak around 609 hours per year for the 25-29 year age group and maintain 
a level plateau through the 55-59 year age group; then, the number of reported flight hours 
rapidly decline for the 60-64 and 65-69 year age groups. It can reasonably be assumed that 
this sharp decline is a direct result of the Age 60 Rule; besides, there are not many reasons 
for a pilot age 60 or older to get a first class certificate, especially if he/she is not entitled to 
its privileges. The annual hours flown for second class holders remain relatively stable at 
around 190 hours per year for all age groups. In contrast, the reported flight hours for 
third class holders steadily increase with age; beginning with a low of 26 hours per year for 
the 20-24 year age group to a high of 65 hours per year for the 65-69 year age group. 
The remaining figures show the accident statistics by the type of license held, and 
the type of operation. Figures 3 and 4 represent accident records for ATPs and 
commercial pilots. The accident data depicted in these figures indicate increasing safety 
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Figure 2. Annual Hours Flown per Pilot by Medical Certificate (1982-1988). 
Source: COMSIS Research Corporation 
through the late 40s; e.g., the accident record per 1,000 active ATPs starts from a high of 
11.71 for the 20-24 year age group, declines to a low of 2.88 for the 45-49 year age 
group, and then climbs to 3.78 for the 55-59 year age group. The 3.78 figure for the 55-
59 year age group compares favorably with the 3.77 figure for the 35-39 year age group 
(see Figure 3). The accident records per 1,000 active ATPs and commercial pilots both 
show similar patterns (see Figures 3 and 4). Accident records are highest for the youngest 
group (i.e., the 20-24 year age group), then progressively decline and reach a low for the 
45-49 year age group, afterward there is a slight increase for the 50-54 and 55-59 year age 
groups. However, with both the ATP and the commercial pilot groups, the 50-59 year 
old pilots have lower accident records than the 30-39 year age groups. 
In marked contrast, Figures 5 and 6 show that the accident record per 1,000 active 
pilots, for both private pilots and airline pilots, is lowest for the youngest group, and then 
progressively increases up to the 55-59 year age group. For example, the accident record 
Accidents per 1,000 Active ATPs 
12 . 1L21 
Figure 3. Accident Records for Air Transport Pilots (1982-1988). Source: NTSB 
Accident Data Division & FAA's Statistical Handbook on Aviation 
Accidents per 1,000 Active Commercial Pilots 
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Figure 4. Accident Records for Commercial Pilots (1983-1986). Source: NTSB 
Accident Data Division & FAA rs Slalislical Handbook on Aviation 
Accidents per 1,000 Active Private Pilots 
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Figure 5. Accident Records for Private Pilots (1982-1987). Source: AOPA 
Air Safely Database & FAA's Statistical Handbook on Aviation 
Accidents per 1,000 Active Airline Pilots 
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Figure 6. Accident Records for Airline Pilots (1982-1988). Source: NTSB 
Accident Data Division & FAA's Aeromedical Certification Statistical Handbook 
per 1,000 active private pilots starts at a low of 2.63 for the 20-24 year age group, and 
increases in a linear fashion to 4.97 for the 55-59 year age group. However, the accident 
data in Figures 3 through 6 do not consider exposure (i.e., the number of hours flown). 
Accident statistics based on exposure data (i.e., accidents per 100,000 annual hours 
flown) for the different pilot groups present a different picture. Figures 7, 8, and 9 
represent accident rates for ATPs, commercial pilots, and private pilots. An examination 
and comparison of these three figures indicates the presence of a common age-related 
pattern: increasing safety through the 40s with a slight decrease in the late 50s; e.g., the 
accident rate per 100,000 annual hours flown for ATPs starts from a high of 2.74 for the 
20-24 year age group, declines to a low of 0.48 for the 45-49 year age group and then 
climbs to 0.63 for the 55-59 year age group. The 0.63 figure for the 55-59 year age group 
again compares favorably with the 0.66 figure for the 35-39 year age group (see Figure 7). 
All three figures (ATPs, commercial pilots, and private pilots) show that active pilots in 
their 50s have lower accident rates than pilots in their 20s and 30s. 
Accidents per 100,000 Annual Hours Flown by ATPs 
20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 
Pilot Age Groups 
Figure 7. Accident Rates for Air Transport Pilots (ATPs) Using First Class 
Annual Hours (1982-1988). Source: NTSB Accident Data Division, FAA's 
Statistical Handbook on Aviation, & COMSIS Research Corporation 
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Accidents per 100,000 Annual Hours Flown by Commercial Pilots 
20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 
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Figure 8. Accident Rates for Commercial Pilots Using Second Class Annual 
Hours (1983-1986). Source: NTSB Accident Data Division, FAA's Statistical 
Handbook on Aviation, &. COMSIS Research Corporation 
Accidents pe r 100,000 Annua l Hours Flown by Private Pilots 
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Figure 9. Accident Rates for Private Pilots Using Third Class Annual Hours 
(1982-1987). Source: AOPA Air Safely Database, FAA's Slalislical Handbook 
on Aviation, & COMSIS Research Corporation 
The relationship between the number of "pilot error" or pilot caused accidents as a 
percentage of the total number of accidents was also examined. This data is somewhat 
unique as compared to the other accident statistics because it includes pilots age 60 and 
over. Figures 10 and 12 show the percentage of accidents classified as pilot error for 
ATPs and general aviation operators. Both figures show the percentage of accidents 
classified as pilot error decreasing slightly with age, suggesting that pilots in their 50s 
and evens 60s are less likely to experience a pilot error accident, as compared to those 
pilots in their 20s and 30s (i.e., with the exception of the 60-64 year old ATPs and 70-79 
year old general aviation pilots). However, in contrast, Figure 11 shows that the older 
commercial pilots are the ones more likely to experience a pilot error accident; however, 
the differences are quite small until pilots reach their 60s. Nevertheless, all three figures 
consistently illustrate the importance of experience as inferred from the type of license 
held; i.e., ATPs have the highest levels of flight time followed by commercial pilots and 
then general aviation pilots. For the time period specified, pilots possessing an ATP 
certificate have a 61.3% chance of an accident being classified as pilot error, as compared 
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Figure 10. Percentage of Accidents Classified as Pilot Error 
for Air Transport Pilots (1982-1988). Source: NTSB Accident 
Data Division 
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Figure 11. Percentage of Accidents Classified as Pilot Error • 
for Commercial Pilots (1983-1986). Source: NTSB Accident 
Data Division 
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Figure 12. Percentage of Accidents Classified as Pilot Caused 
for General Aviation Operators (1982-1987). Source: AOPA 
Air Safety Database 
to 74.4% and 77.5% chance for commercial pilots and general aviation operators, 
respectively. 
The Chi-squared (x2) statistical technique was selected to evaluate particular data 
in order to test the hypothesis advanced. The x 2 is a nonparametric test of significance 
appropriate when data are in the form of frequency measures (e.g., number of observed 
accidents). The x2 goodness-of-fit test determines whether a statistically significant 
difference exists between the proportions observed and the proportions expected. As can 
be seen from the formula, the x2 value dramatically increases as the difference between 
the the observed and expected frequencies increase. 
Formula: %2 = J ^ 
Where: O is the number of accidents observed, and 
E is the expected number of accidents based 
on the pilot population. 
The calculated results of x2 can be seen in Tables 6, 7, and 8. Using p=.001 the 
X2 = 24.32 and 22.46, with d/=7 and d/=6, respectively. Because the observed x2 
values are larger than is required at the/?=.001 level, it is concluded that the differences 
between the observed and expected frequencies are significant across three groups of 
pilots beyond the .001 level; therefore, the null hypothesis that aging has no effect on 
pilot performance capabilities as inferred from the observed-over-expected frequency of 
accidents is rejected. However, the trends across the three groups were inconsistent. In 
Tables 6 and 7, the data for commercial pilots and ATPs shows that the significant x2ts 
are because the younger pilots age 20-39 experienced more accidents than expected, and 
the older pilots age 40-59 generally had fewer accidents than expected. However, in 
Table 8, the older airline pilots age 45-59 appear to have had a significantly greater 
Table 6. Chi-Squared Test Results Using Commercial Pilot Data 
(1983-1986) 
Pilot Age 
Groups 
20-24 
25-29 
30-34 
35-39 
40-44 
45-49 
50-54 
55-59 
Total 
Number of 
Pilots 
35,773 
71,012 
69,993 
93,920 
95,444 
73,759 
60,785 
42,230 
542,916 
Observed 
Accidents (O) 
380 
613 
672 
877 
653 
467 
427 
323 
4,412 
Expected 
Accidents (E) 
290.71 
577.08 
568.80 
763.24 
775.62 
599.40 
493.97 
343.18 
4,412 
(O-E) 
89.29 
35.92 
103.20 
113.76 
-122.62 
-132.40 
-66.97 
-20.18 
0.00 
(0-E)2/E 
27.43 
2.24 
18.73 
16.96 
19.39 
29.25 
9.08 
1.19 
124.24 
Source: NTSB Accident Data Division & FAA's Statistical Handbook on Aviation 
Table 7. Chi-Squared Test Results Using Air Transport Pilot (ATP) Data 
(1982-1988) 
Pilot Age 
Groups 
20-24 
25-29 
30-34 
35-39 
40-44 
45-49 
50-54 
55-59 
Total 
Number of 
Pilots 
3,757 
43,706 
86,841 
107,338 
101,536 
89,229 
69,930 
42,884 
545,221 
Observed 
Accidents (O) 
44 
243 
357 
405 
319 
257 
232 
162 
2,019 
Expected 
Accidents (E) 
13.91 
161.85 
321.58 
397.48 
376.00 
330.42 
258.96 
158.80 
2,019 
(O-E) 
30.09 
81.15 
35.42 
7.52 
-57.00 
-73.42 
-26.96 
3.20 
0.00 
(0-E)2/E 
65.07 
40.69 
3.90 
0.14 
8.64 
16.32 
2.81 
0.06 
137.63 
Source: NTSB Accident Data Division & FAA's Statistical Handbook on Aviation 
Table 8. Chi-Squared Test Results Using Part 121 (Airline Pilot) Data 
(1982-1988) 
Pilot Age 
Groups 
25-29 
30-34 
35-39 
40-44 
45-49 
50-54 
55-59 
Number of 
Pilots 
30,800 
50,035 
57,833 
59,726 
62,708 
44,153 
22,406 
Observed 
Accidents (O) 
2 
11 
7 
13 
20 
19 
15 
Expected 
Accidents (E) 
8.18 
13.29 
15.36 
15.86 
16.65 
11.72 
5.95 
(O-E) 
-6.18 
-2.29 
-8.36 
-2.86 
3.35 
7.28 
9.05 
(0-E)2/E 
4.67 
0.39 
4.55 
0.52 
0.67 
4.52 
13.77 
Total 327,661 87 87 Q.QQ 29.08 
Source: NTSB Accident Data Division & FAA's Aeromedical Certification Statistical Handbook 
number of accidents. This result should be interpreted with great caution, since only one 
out of the three sets of comparisons yielded this result and the airline pilots have an 
extremely low accident rate. 
CONCLUSION 
The results of this study support the rejection of the null hypothesis that aging has 
no measurable effect on pilot performance as inferred from the number of accidents among 
pilots. The y} analysis indicated that the observed frequency of accidents was 
significantly different than the expected frequency among active pilots. However, the 
analysis for airline pilots showed the older pilots age 45-59 had significantly more 
accidents than expected. It may be that the PIC factor contributes to this increase in 
accidents (e.g., it is likely that there are many more older airline captains than there are 
younger ones, and in an accident report, it is the PIC who gets charged with the accident 
whether he/she was flying the airplane or not). On the basis of the data presented, it was 
determined that there may in fact be some point in a pilot's career (e.g., a threshold level) 
after which performance gradually declines. The data presented herein consistently 
suggests that this decline occurs in the fifth decade for the majority of pilots. 
Current medical screening procedures seem to be quite effective in eliminating 
those pilots who fall below the accepted medical standards. Pilots with medical problems 
are screened out of the active population at an increasing rate in association with the more 
advanced age groups. However, the validity of this data can be argued to be ambiguous 
because the very high number of medical denials of struggling airlines suggests that these 
denials could be a result of other factors than aging per se (e.g., management/union 
disagreements, political issues). Although much of the physiological and psychological 
literature would predict that performance decrements should begin in the late 20s and early 
30s, the accident data indicate that the pilot safety records continue to improve through the 
40s. This improvement probably indicates that the benefits of experience exceed any of 
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the initial effects of aging; however, the effects of age and experience are more complex 
and difficult to evaluate and xequire further study. 
The high accident statistics observed for younger pilots 20-24 years old, 
particularly among ATPs and commercial pilots, could be a result of other factors rather 
than their limited flight experience. These younger pilots, particularly those who work for 
commuter airlines, usually get the least desireable and most hazardous routes from the 
airline bidding process because of their low seniority. This bidding process also limits 
these pilots to the type of aircraft they fly (i.e., new and automated versus old and 
antiquated), thus increasing their risk and exposure factors considerably. However, some 
of these well-trained younger pilots may be just as safe as the older pilots; but, because the 
way our system is set up, the issue as to whether younger pilots are less safe than older 
pilots becomes more confounding. 
The slight increase in the number of accident statistics involving pilots age 50 and 
over suggests that the benefits of experience may have an upper threshold limit. After this 
upper limit is reached or exceeded, the effects of age-related decrements appear to impact 
the safety record. In contrast, the accident record per 1,000 active private pilots, who as a 
group have significantly less flying experience than ATPs and commercial pilots, shows 
the type of progressive increase in accidents that would be predicted by the physiological 
and psychological literature. It could be that this progressive increase in accidents is a 
result of the very limited amount of hours flown by private pilots (i.e., third class holders), 
Their recent exposure rate is just too low to really get proficient in their flying skills. 
However, when the data for private pilots arc adjusted by the number of hours flown, the 
safety level increases through the early 40s and then remains relatively stable with a slight 
decrease in safety in the late 50s. 
The accident data suggest that there is a decrease in the safety and effectiveness of 
pilots by age 60. Whether this decrease in the older pilots' safely records is critical or not 
is difficult to establish. In comparing the records of the older groups of pilots with the 
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younger groups who will be replacing them, the effectiveness of the Age 60 Rule would 
appear to be open to question. Compared to pilots in their 40s, the older pilots are 
slightly less safe, but compared to the younger pilots who would replace them, they seem 
to be slightly better. However, it is difficult to speculate how well the accident statistics 
would compare if older pilots were allowed to fly beyond age 60. 
The debate as to whether or not older pilots are more at risk because of sudden 
incapacitation does not seem to be a major issue. Sudden incapacitation does not appear to 
be an age-related problem; it is more frequently associated with food poisoning. It is 
interesting to note that the age group most likely to suffer from sudden incapacitqfion (i.e., 
45-49 year olds) is also the age group with the safest accident statistics. However, 
whether older pilots are more at risk because of undetected decrements in physical or 
mental performance has yet to be determined. The age trends within the data presented 
suggest that there are some noticeable changes with increasing age, especially after age 50. 
Although the literature suggests that there are a variety of tests which could be used to 
determine a pilot's reaction time and cognitive skills, there is very little information 
available which relates these measures to actual piloting skills. It is clear from the 
literature presented, that progressively fewer older pilots are able to meet the first class 
medical standards. Reinhart (1991) stated, " . . .wc become less tolerant to the extremes 
of life, especially in the flight environment, and wc become unable to maintain the fine 
tuning of our skills like we had in the good old days of our youth" (p. 13). 
Despite the limitations addressed in this study, the evidence herein raises at least 
one point of general importance—the effects of experience may be greater than the effects 
of age for pilots between 20 and 49 years of age. Although the amount of recent 
experience is perhaps more important to flight safety than age alone, it was not addressed in 
this study because of the complexities in the databases. In addition, the consistent 
differences among pilot groups in the accident statistics by age 50 may be partly a result of 
factors other than aging alone. Such factors include cohort effects, altitude, motivation to 
fly, the fact that accidents are attributed to the PIC who may not necessarily be the one at 
the controls, and especially the cross-sectional nature of the study itself. 
Summary 
The objective of this study was to identify and report the issues relevant to the Age 
60 Rule. This study as a whole lends support to the hypothesis advanced that pilot safety 
decreases for the most senior age groups (50-59 years old). It was generally observed that 
accident rates declined from the 20s through the late 40s, and then gradually increased in 
the 50s. There are also some striking similarities between the accident statistics and the 
medical issues presented herein; i.e., both show an age-related trend in the fifth decade. In 
general, the results show that pilots in their 40s experience the lowest accident rates. The 
data suggest that aging effects may outweigh the positive effects of experience in a pilot's 
fifth decade. 
To this day, the Age 60 Rule remains to be a controversial topic. The medical 
issues, as they relate to piloting an aircraft, clearly impact the situation and obviously 
favor younger pilots. We must always seek ways to improve aviation safety. In 
comparing the records of the older groups of pilots with the younger groups who will be 
replacing them, the Age 60 Rule appears to diminish the overall safety level. However, it 
is again difficult to fully predict what would happen to the safety level if the current age 
limit for airline pilots was increased into the 60s—perhaps the Age 60 Rule would be 
supported. We must keep in mind that individual abilities and capacities vary 
dramatically. Professionally trained pilots with high levels of experience may in fact be 
able to cope with some of their selective sensory and cognitive losses and may also be 
capable of maintaining an acceptable safety record even into their sixth or seventh decade. 
If the Age 60 Rule were to be changed, what are the alternative options available? 
More comprehensive and costly medical exams? More detailed and monitored LOFT 
sessions? Even though the results of this study support the notion that older and 
experienced pilots are safer than those who will replace them, Reinhart (1991) offered 
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some interesting philosophical questions that we should consider. Reinhart queried 
whether airline pilots would really want the responsibility of the added burden of more 
costly and comprehensive testing and monitoring merely to fly for just a few more years, 
keeping in mind the ever present possibility of not meeting new standards at some 
unexpected point in time. "Or is it more prudent to plan for a stated age, continue to 
accept the present standards, and have more control of when to expect retirement for pilot 
and company?" (p. 17). At the present time, the Age 60 Rule remains to be a conservative 
approach to the aging and safety issues; however, the rule could very well be 
counterproductive by retiring our most seasoned and experienced pilots and replacing 
them with much younger and less qualified pilots. Nevertheless, it is presumed that until 
more advanced cognitive screening techniques are developed and validated, the rule will 
most likely remain unchanged. 
Recommendations 
The accident statistics for pilots age 60 and over could not be calculated as initially 
expected. These pilots are not specifically represented in the FAA's database. For 
example, the FAA's Statistical Handbook on Aviation lists the upper age group for license 
holders (i.e., private, commercial, and ATPs) as 60+. Since there are many more older 
active pilots today, as compared to previous years (Mohler, 1986), it should be 
recommended that these pilots be accounted for until at least 65-69. This will allow future 
studies to benefit and utilize this data in order to get accurate statistics for these pilots as 
well, and to see if the trends increase even more beyond age 60. 
Additional research with improved methodology (e.g., actual flying hours rather 
than medical class hours) is necessary before authoritative conclusions can be reached 
concerning the effects of age and experience on flight safety. The optimal means of 
determining whether there are any significant age decrements among older pilots is to 
conduct a longitudinal study; although very costy, a longitudinal study utilizing state-of-
the-art technologies and appropriate measures of pilot performance would provide very 
beneficial information, therefore it is strongly recommended. It is also suggested that 
future studies use a recent time interval (e.g., just those pilots with >600 annual hours) in 
order to study the effects of recency and age on accident rates. For example, many of the 
ATPs and airline pilots involved in accidents often had more than 600 hours per year, as 
compared to some private pilots with only 30 hours per year. 
Furthermore, there are highly advanced modern simulators that can duplicate real-
life conditions along with the aircraft characteristics. These training devices should be 
able to screen out or at least identify pilot performance decrements objectively provided 
that standardized test and evaluation procedures can be agreed upon. Sterns et al. (1985) 
found that psychological tests designed to identify subtle changes in cognitive functioning 
have not been systematically administered to pilots. It would be useful to design future 
studies utilizing these psychological tests in order to help assess pilot performance 
involving complex tasks. Additionally, Salthouse (1987) stated, "Since accident 
avoidance behaviors often demand maximum response, tests should include demanding as 
well as moderate tasks" (p. 720). Future studies should also attempt to validate the use of 
LOFT and other assessment techniques on subjects that are current and proficient in their 
flying skills, particularly airline pilots where a high level of knowledge and skill is 
essential. Although, some literature (e.g., Salthouse) has already supported the 
development of screening and assessment approaches for airline pilots over 60 in order to 
identify those individuals who may be experiencing or who have already experienced 
some age-related changes that may reduce their functional level of skills. 
The physiological and psychological literature adequately documents the evidence 
that human cognitive and sensory capabilities begin to decline in the late 20s. The accident 
data indicate that pilot safety continues to improve into the late 40s. Just how these age-
related effects and experience alter pilot capacities is not well understood. This area is 
fruitful with opportunities for future research topics which should attempt to get a better 
understanding of these age-related effects on the pilot population. 
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Subpart M—Airman and 
Crewmember Requirements 
SOURCE: Docket No. 6258, 29 FR 19212, 
Dec. 31, 1964, unless otherwise noted. 
§ 121.381 Applicability. 
This subpart prescribes airman and 
crewmember requirements for all cer-
tificate holders. 
§ 121.383 Airman: Limitations on use of 
services. 
(a) No certificate holder may use 
any person as an airman nor may any 
person serve as an airman unless tha t 
pe rson-
CD Holds an appropriate current 
airman certificate issued by the FAA; 
(2) Has any required appropriate 
current airman and medical certifi-
cates in his possession while engaged 
in operations under this part; and 
(3) Is otherwise qualified for the op-
eration for which he is to be used. 
(b) Each airman covered by para-
graph (a)(2) of this section shall 
present either or both certificates for 
inspection upon the request of the Ad-
ministrator. 
(c) No certificate holder may use the 
services of any person as a pilot on an 
airplane engaged in operations under 
this part if that person has reached 
his 60th birthday. No person may 
serve as a pilot on an airplane engaged 
in operations under this part if tha t 
person has reached his 60th birthday. 
[Doc. No. 6258, 29 FR 19212, Dec. 31, 1964, 
as amended by Amdt. 121-144, 43 FR 22646, 
May 25, 1978] 
Note. From Code of Federal Regulations, Title 14 (p. 436), 1990, Washington, DC: U.S. 
Government Printing Office. 
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Civil Aviation Authority 
• 
G.P.OBox367 
Canberra 
ACT 2501 
Australia 
Telephone: (062) 684111 
Telex: 62221 
FAX: (062) 485239 
Mr Patr i ck C Guide 
Box 1391 
Embry-Riddle Aeronaut ica l U n i v e r s i t y 
DAYTONA BEACH FLORIDA 32114-3900 
Dear Mr Guide 
Your letter of 16 August 1990 to Senator the Hon Bob Collins, 
Minister for Shipping and Aviation Support, has been referred to 
the Civil Aviation Authority for reply. 
You sought information on upper age limits for pilots in 
Australia. In respect of non-commercial operations, I can 
advise that there is no upper age limit applied to pilots, 
provided they satisfy the medical standards appropriate to the 
level of licence held. 
For commercial and higher category licences there is also no 
upper age limit, but there are limitations placed upon pilots 
who have attained the age of 60 years. I have enclosed copies 
of the relevant Civil Aviation Orders which set out these 
limitations. 
I trust this information will be of some assistance to you. 
A E HEGGEN 
Group General Manager 
Safety Regulation 
Qyran 
October 1990 
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f=/NNPJ/R 
Flight Department/U. Koskela/tm 14 December 1990 
Patrick C. Guide 
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University 
Box 1391 
Daytona Beach, FL 32114-3900 
USA 
Your letter of 27 August 1990 
UPPER AGE LIMITS 
I am sorry for our late reply. 
The upper age limits are as follows: 
Type of licence upper age limit 
Private pilot's licence no age limit 
Commercial pilot's licence 60 years 
Air Trafffic pilot's licence 60 years 
These limits are valid if there is no medical reasons to 
cancel the pilot's licence earlier. 
With best regards, 
FINNAIR 
Flight Department 
xUrpb Koskela 
Chief Pilot 
Postilokero 
Helsinki-Vantaan Lentoasema 
PL 68-69 
01531 VANTAA 
Helsinki Airport 
PL 68-69 
01531 VANTAA 
FINLAND 
Puhelin - Telephone 
Keskus - Exchange (90) 818 51 
Ohivalinta - Direct Line (90) 818.. 
Telex 
124396 
Telefax 
(90) 818 6700 
Luftfahrt-Bundesamt 
Au6enst«11« Berlin 
Referat Flugmedizin 
luftfafcrt-lmitfisiat A*flt«ittM( I t r l U 
riiufcafxt . 0-1189 |« r l In-Sch B«c r • 1 d 
Hr. Patrick C. Guide 
170 Iron Gate Circle 
Port Orange, FL 32119 
USA 
(Dill* bet Anlworl angcbon) 
Ihre Zeictan und Nachncht vo»n Un»«/* ZAICIMM 
07- 09. 1990 B 23l7dr.do-gr 
Tgb.-IIr. ik9 
Dear Ur. Guide, 
Please excuse my late response. 
Hr. Krupper handed me your letter dated Sep. 7th 1990 
regarding your study relating changes in flying safety as 
a function of pilot age. 
In the former GDR there was no regulation concerning a upper 
age limit of 60 years however we only know about two pilots 
of this age. 
The age - criteria v/hich terminated an aviators career were 
the medical regulations for Licensing only. 
A study performed by INTERFLUG has indicated, that older pilots 
were not involved in more accidents, failures or inflight -
incapacitations then younger pilots. 
Further indepth information could possitly be received from 
INTERFLUG. 
Ilany g/eetings 
Dr/ Dollny 
unser* Ourchwuhi B e r l i n - S c h O n e f e l d 
672 4 0 2 7 0 6 . 11 .
 # 1 9 9 0 
D i e n s t s t e l l e : Berlin-SchOnefeld f lughafen , Telefon (00372)6720 
Telefax (00372)6788216 Telex 112891 oifvzk 
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FOftMA C C ! A 
DIRECCION GEKERAL DE AEROKAUTICA CIVIL 
DIRECCION TECNICA Y DE SUPERVISION 
101.204.-237 3 6 2 3 2 
SECRE7ARIA DC COMUNICACIONES <£>£. 
TRAHSPORTES ^ 
Mexico, D.F., 3 de octubre de 1990. ^<g^ 5g] 
PATRICK C. GUIDE <<%> ^ ^ 
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University . W*& f?(72\ 
Box 1391 *«> W) 
Daytona Beach, FL 32114-3900 yZ& \F=* 
U.S.A. 4 -
En relacion a su atenta de fecha 27 de agosto proximo pasado, roe permito 
informarle que en nuestro Pais no existe restriccion legal por edad a -
ningun piloto para volar en la aviacion general, el unico requisito es -
que pasen los examenes medicos establecidos por la Direccion General de 
Medicina Preventiva en el Transporte a traves de la Subdireccion de Medl 
cina- de Aviacion, los cuales son mas rigurosos en ciertos aspectos que -
los normales de otro Pais, sin embargo algunos erapleadores no aceptan — 
pilotos mayores de 60 anos. Por otra parte en convenios contractuales -
celebrados entre la Asociacion Sindical de Pilotos Aviadores de Mexico, 
Mexicana de Aviacion, Aerovias de Mexico y otras pequenas companlas de -
lineas aereas, se ha fijado la fecha maxima para prestar servicios hasta 
la edad de 60 anos a los cuales deberan retirarse protegidos con progra-
mas de retiro o jubilacion. 
Los pilotos eliminados por causas medicas son indemnizados de acuerdo a_ 
los Contratos firmados con la Asociacion Sindical de'Pilotos y sumadas a 
las senaladas por la Ley Federal del Trabajo de nuestro Pais. 
v-^^uA 
ENRIQUE ZAPATA B 
WtfCflS* -vf*;. ;. <;;,.„.,, 
=0 
m 
Esperando que la informacion sea de utilidad. C=u 
A t e n t a m e n t e . \OJ 
SUFRAGIO EFECTIVO. NO REELECCION. 
EL DIRECTOR GENERAL. 
m 
••'A ,-JV: 
:
 • '..•.;'.'?u tf umumiti en .^  ' 
CAP. FBT*ahp. ••• i - K v O Ofir.-v- . . . . , . . , . . . . , . „ , 
- . . "•*•' • *5|MiVS 
E NTRAD/ 
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General Direction of Civil Aeronautic 
Technical and Supervisory Direction 
Mexico, D.F., October 3,1990 
In relation to your courteous letter dated August 27, may I inform you that in our country 
there are no legal restrictions due to age for pilots in order to fly in general aviation, the 
only requirement is that they pass the medical exams established by the General OfQce of 
Preventative Medicine in Transportation through the subdivision of Aviation Medicine. 
These exams are more rigorous in certain aspects than the regular exams from other 
countries, notwithstanding some companies do not accept pilots older than 60 years of age. 
On the other hand, in negotiations between the Pilots Association of Mexico and the two 
largest air carriers of Mexico, along with the other smaller airlines, it has been established 
that the latest date to fly will be at the age of 60 at which time the pilot should retire with a 
pension program. 
Those pilots that are eliminated for medical reasons are paid in accordance with the 
contracts signed by the Pilots Association and in accordance to the pertaining Federal Labor 
Regulations of our country. 
I hope this information will be useful for you. 
Sincerely. 
General Director 
Enrique Zapata B. 
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OFFICE OF AIR ACCIDENTS INVESTIGATION 
31 August 1990 
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University 
Daytona Beach, FL 32114-3900 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
Dear Mr Guide 
Reference your letter of 16 August. 
Herewith the data re age and experience of pilots involved in 
accidents to fixed wing powered aircraft from 1983 - 1987. 
There is no upper age limit for pilots in New Zealand. 
An aviator's career is terminated if he develops a medical 
condition for which a waiver cannot be issued. 
The cost of the enclosed printout, time and postage is US$36. 
Yours faithfully 
R Chippindale 
Chief Inspector of Air Accidents 
Encl 
14TH FLOOR. INVESTMENT HOUSE. CNR BALLANCE & FEATHERSTON ST. WELLINGTON 
PO Box 1210 Wellington Telephone (04) 733-112 Telex NZ 30630 
Fa« (04) 499-1510 
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KIRKVAAGbelundler " HOrtUkCMINISrRA&IONEN 
• s U s * LUFTFARTSVERKET 
HCVEDHDMINtSTRASIONEN 
AVOEUNG FOR LUFTFAKISINSPEiaON 
Patrick C. Guide, 
170 Iron Gate Circle 
Port Orange, FL 32119, 
USA. 
24th Sept 1990 Vir referanse Deres dato Deres referanse 
90/06109 741 900829 L e t t e r 
STATISTICS IN REGARDS TO AIRCRAFT ACCIDENTS IN NORWAY. 
Thank you for your letter about the above mentioned 
statistics. 
We are sorry to inform you that we do not have any 
information about changes in flying status as a function 
of pilot age. 
All private pilots are able to fly as long as they have 
valid medical papers and satisfy our minimum flying hours 
per year, or have passed a two-yearly PFT (Periodic Flight 
Training). 
Commercial pilots have to stop flying internationally when 
they reach the age of 60 years. 
Certainly, pilots may also end their career if they have any 
kind of serious illness that prohibit further flying. 
This is according to international rules and regulationes. 
This is also an answer of your letter to SAS about the same 
subject. 
Yours sincerely 
Y i ^ - , 
Tor B. Kirkvaag, 
Chief Inspector. 
Potlodw* KonlorooVww Weton IWUfoi AFTN T«UI T«Ugrom 
rWboki l l GomUSnor.yvv.M47 Noifrnok (0?) ?9 ?? 40 Nowonoh 107159 34*9 TISol ClVlLAIR 
1330 OSLO IUFTHAVN ForiwbuNord lnltrnoH-*47 2 59 33 40 Inttrnotj. • 47 7 59 34 69 ENCAYEYX •**,**
 n QSIO 
Civil Aviation Authority 
Safety Regulation Group 
Aviation House 3 W 
South Area 
Gatwick Airport 
Gatwick 
West Sussex RH6 0YR 
Tel: Switchboard 0293 567171 
Telex: 878753 Fax: 0293 573999 
LHJ^J^JT 
Mr Patrick C Guide 
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University 
Daytona Beach 
FL 32114-3900 
Our Ref: 10MG/03/01/10 
VP:JH725 
23 August, 1990 
Thank you for your further letter dated 16 August 1990, regarding upper 
age limits for pilots and aviators careers. 
There is no upper age limit for the holders of Private Pilots Licences 
(PPL). However, there is an increase in the frequency of medical 
examination: 
Under 40 
40 - 50 
50 - 70 
Over 70 
60 months 
24 months 
12 months 
6 months 
The privileges of Professional Pilot Licence holders are restricted in 
respect of Public Transport at 60 years of age to require him/her to fly 
as a member of a crew of 2-pilots or more and then only in aircraft with 
a Maximum Total Weight Authorised not exceedidng 20,000 kg. A 
Professional Pilot Licence holder cannot fly for Public Transport when 
aged 65 years or more. A Professional Pilot Licence holder can 
otherwise fly any aircraft included in his licence up to any 
provided he remains fit and can qualify for a medical certificate. 
age 
The Authority has no say in the employment of pilots or their career 
structure. 
I hope this information is sufficient, please do not hesitate to write 
to me again. 
_§A**£ 
Miss J Harris 
Management Support Unit 
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APPENDIX C 
H.R. 3498 
I 
1 0 1 S T CONGRESS 
1ST SESSION H. R. 3498 
To amend the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 to limit the age restrictions imposed 
upon aircraft pilots. 
IN THE HOUSE OF EEPEESENTATIVES 
OCTOBER 19, 1989 
Mr. LIGHTFOOT (for himself, Mr. BALLENGEE, Mr. CHAPMAN, Mr. DUNCAN, Mr. 
EMEESON, Mr. HANCOCK, Mr. HAYES of Illinois, Mr. INHOFE, Mr. LAUGH-
LIN, Mr. PACKAED, Mr. DENNY SMITH, Mr. HASTEET, Mr. GEANT, Mr. 
JONES of Georgia, and Mr. PAYNE of Virginia) introduced the following bill; 
which was referred to the Committee on Public Works and Transportation 
A BILL 
To amend the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 to limit the age 
restrictions imposed upon aircraft pilots. 
1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 
3 SECTION 1. LIMITATION ON AGE RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED 
4 UPON AIRCRAFT PILOTS. 
5 Section 602(b) of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (49 
6 U.S.C. 1422(b)) is amended by adding at the end thereof the 
7 following new paragraph: 
2 
1 "(3) LIMITATION ON AGE RESTRICTIONS.—The 
2 Administrator shall not, solely by reason of the age of 
3 a person, if such person is less than 65 years of age— 
4 "(A) refuse to issue an airman certificate to, 
5 or refuse to renew such certificate for, such 
6 person, if such person is applying for the issuance 
7 or renewal of such certificate in order to serve or 
8 continue to serve as a pilot of an aircraft; or 
9 "(B) require an air carrier to terminate the 
10 employment of, or refuse to employ, such person 
11 as a pilot on an aircraft of such air carrier.". 
O 
«HR s ^ m 
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APPENDIX D 
PUBLIC LAW 96-171 
PUBLIC LAW 96-171—DEC. 29, 1979 93 STAT. 12S5 
Public Law 96-171 
96th Congress 
An Act 
To require a study of the desirability of mandatory age retirement for certain pilots, 
and Tor other purposes. 
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled, That the Director of 
the National Institutes of Health, in consultation with the Secretary 
of Transportation, shall conduct a study to determine— 
(1) whether an age limitation which prohibits all individuals 
who are sixty years of age or older from serving as pilots is 
medically warranted; 
(2) whether an age limitation which prohibits all individuals 
who are older than a particular age from serving as pilots is 
medically warranted; 
(S) whether rules governing eligibility for first- and second-
class medical certification, as set forth in part 67 of title 14 of the 
Code of Federal Regulations (as in effect on the date of enactment 
of this Act), are adequate to determine an individual's physical 
condition in light of existing medical technology; 
(4) whether rules governing the frequency of first- and second-
class medical examinations, as set forth in part 67 of title 14 of 
the Code of Federal Regulations (as in effect on the date of 
enactment of this Act), are adequate to assure that an individ-
ual's physical condition is being satisfactorily monitored; and 
(5) tne effect of aging on the ability of individuals to perform 
the duties of pilots with the highest level of safety. 
The Director shall complete such study and submit a report oT the 
results thereof to Congress within one year after the date of enact-
ment of this Act. In conducting such study the Director shall utilize 
all available studies and data which are relevant to such study. 
SEC. 2. No funds are authorized to be appropriated for the fiscal 
year commencing October 1, 1979, in addition to funds otherwise 
available to carry out the study described in section 1 of this Act 
Approved December 29,1979. 
Dec. 29.1379 
[H.R. 3948J 
Pilots, study of 
mandatory age 
retirement. 
49 USC 1421 
note. 
14 CFR Part 67. 
Report to 
Congress. 
Appropriation 
authorization. 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY; 
HOUSE REPORT No. 96-474 (Comm. on Public Works and Transportation). 
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD. Vol. 125 (1979): 
Dec 5, considered and parsed House. 
Dec. 18. considered and pas»ed Senate, amended. 
Dec 19, House concurred in Senate amendment. 
Sl-lJt O - »0 (21)) 
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APPENDIX E 
ACCIDENT STATISTICS FOR AIR TRANSPORT PILOTS (ATPs), 
COMMERCIAL PILOTS, PRIVATE PILOTS, PART 121 OPERATORS, 
AND GENERAL AVIATION OPERATORS 
Table E-1. Accident Statistics for Air Transport Pilots (1982-1988) 
No.ofATPs2 
% of ATPs 
1,000s of ATPs 
ATP Accidents Observedb 
ATP Accidents Expected 
Avg. Flight Houis/Pilot 
(Class I holders)0 
100,000 Annual Eight Hours 
Observed/Expected 
Accident Record (accidents 
per 1,000 pilots) 
Accident Rate (accidents per 
100,000 hours) 
20-24 
3,757 
0.64 
3.76 
44 
13.96 
427.1 
16.0 
3.15 
11.71 
2.74 
25-29 
43,706 
7.45 
43.71 
243 
162.45 
608.7 
266.0 
1.50 
5.56 
0.91 
30-34 
86,841 
14.80 
86.84 
357 
322.78 
572.3 
497.0 
1.11 
4.11 
0.72 
35-39 
107,338 
18.29 
107.34 
405 
398.96 
575.9 
618.2 
1.02 
3.77 
0.66 
40-44 
101,536 
17.30 
101.54 
319 
377.40 
571.0 
579.8 
0.85 
3.14 
0.55 
45-49 
89,229 
15.21 
89.23 
257 
331.65 
594.4 
530.4 
0.77 
2.88 
0.48 
50-54 
69,930 
11.92 
69.93 
232 
259.92 
606.2 
423.9 
0.89 
3.32 
0.55 
55-59 
42,884 
7.31 
42.88 
162 
159.39 
598.9 
256.8 
1.02 
3.78 
0.63 
60 + 
41,561 
7.08 
41.56 
162 
154.48 
383.0 
198.7 
1.05 
3.90 
0.82 
TOTAL 
586,782 
100 
586.78 
2,181 
2,181 
575.7 
2,953.0 
1.00 
3.72 
0.74 
aFAA 's Statistical Handbook on Aviation 
^NTSB Accident Data Division 
cCOMSIS Research Corporation data for "active" first class holders 
Table E-2. Accident Statistics for Commercial Pilots (1983-1986) 
No. of Commercial Pilots3 
% of Commercial Pilots 
1,000s of Commercial Pilots 
Commercial Pilot Accidents 
Observed^ 
Commercial Pilot Accidents 
Expected 
Avg. Flight Hours/Pilot 
(Class II holders)0 
100,000 Annual Right Hours 
Observed/Expected 
Accident Record (accidents per 
1,000 pilots) 
Accident Rate (accidents per 
1100,000 hours) 
20-24 
35,773 
5.82 
35.77 
380 
277.84 
155.3 
55.5 
1.37 
10.62 
6.84 
25-29 
71,012 
11.56 
71.01 
613 
551.53 
169.5 
120.4 
1.11 
8.63 
5.09 
30-34 
69,993 
11.40 
69.99 
672 
543.62 
184.1 
128.8 
1.24 
9.60 
5.22 
35-39 
93,920 
15.29 
93.92 
877 
729.46 
205.5 
193.0 
1.20 
9.34 
4.54 
| 40-44 
95,444 
15.54 
95.44 
653 
741.29 
200.3 
191.1 
0.88 
6.84 
3.42 
| 45-49 
73,759 
12.01 
73.76 
467 
572.87 
1943 
143.3 
0.82 
6.33 
3.26 
50-54 
60,785 
9.90 
60.79 
427 
472.10 
187.8 
114.2 
0.90 
7.02 
3.74 
55-59 
42,230 
6.88 
42.23 
323 
327.99 
190.4 
80.4 
0.98 
7.65 
4.02 
| 60 + 
71,238 
11.60 
71.24 
358 
553.29 
183.1 
130.4 
0.65 
5.03 
2.74 
TOTAL 1 
614,154 
100 
614.15 
4,770 
4,770 
167.0 
1,025.7 
1.00 
7.77 
4.65 
aFAA 's Statistical Handbook on Aviation 
bNTSB Accident Data Division 
°COMSIS Research Corporation data for "active" second class holders 
Table E-3. Accident Statistics for Private Pilots (1982-1987) 
No. of Private pilots3 
% of Private pilots 
1,000s of Private pilots 
Private Pilot Accidents 
Observed0 
Private Pilot Accidents 
Expected 
Avg. Flight Hours/Pilot 
(Class m holders)0 
100,000 Annual Flight Hours 
Observed/Expected 
' Accident Record (accidents per 
1,000 pilots) 
Accident Rate (accidents per 
1100,000 hours) 
20-24 
148,521 
8.77 
148.52 
391 
580.58 
26.1 
38.8 
0.67 
2.63 
10.09 
25-29 
222,803 
13.15 
222.80 
652 
870.96 
30.9 
68.8 
0.75 
2.93 
9.47 
30-34 
274,569 
16.21 
27457 
1,004 
1,073.32 
38.1 
104.6 
0.94 
3.66 
9.60 
35-39 
277,461 
16.38 
277.46 
1,042 
1,084.63 
46.7 
129.6 
0.96 
3.76 
8.04 
40-44 
242,969 
14.34 
242.97 
1,001 
949.79 
54.7 
132.9 
1.05 
4.12 
7.53 
45-49 
194,650 
11.49 
194.65 
904 
760.91 
60.2 
117.2 
1.19 
4.64 
7.71 
50-54 
175,205 
10.34 
175.21 
843 
684.90 
62.6 
109.7 
1.23 
4.81 
7.69 
55-59 
158,070 
9.33 
158.07 
786 
617.91 
63.7 
100.6 
1.27 
4.97 
7.81 
TOTAL 
1,694,248 
100 
1694.25 
6,623 
6,623 
48.3 
817.8 
1.00 
3.91 
8.10 
aFAA 's Statistical Handbook on Aviation 
bAOPA Air Safety Database 
cCOMSIS Research Corporation data for "active" third class holders 
Table E-4. Accident Statistics for Airline Pilots (1982-1988) 
No. of Airline Pilots3 
% of Airline Pilots 
1,000s of Airline Pilots 
Airline Pilot Accidents 
Observed0 
Airline Pilot Accidents 
Expected 
Avg. Flight Hours/Pilot 
(Class I holders)0 
100,000 Annual Flight Hours 
Observed/Expected 
Accident Record (accidents per 
1,000 pilots) 
Accident Rate (accidents per 
100,000 hours) 
25-29 
30,800 
9.40 
30.80 
2 
8.18 
608.7 
187.5 
0.24 
0.06 
0.011 
30-34 
50,035 
15.27 
50.04 
11 
13.29 
572.3 
286.4 
0.83 
0.22 
0.038 
I 35-39 
57,833 
17.65 
57.83 
7 
15.36 
575.9 
333.1 
0.46 
0.12 
0.021 
40-44 
59,726 
18.23 
59.73 
13 
15.86 
571.0 
341.0 
0.82 
0.22 
0.038 
45-49 
62,708 
19.14 
62.71 
20 
16.65 
594.4 
372.7 
1.20 
0.32 
0.054 
50-54 
44,153 
13.48 
44.15 
19 
11.72 
606.2 
267.7 
1.62 
0.43 
0.071 
55-59 
22,406 
6.84 
j 22.41 
15 
! 5.95 
598.9 
134.2 
2.52 
0.67 
0.112 
TOTAL 
327,661 
100 
327.66 
87 
87 
589.6 
1,932.0 
1.00 
0.27 
0.045 
aCAMI,s Aeromedical Certification Statistical Handbook 
^NTSB Accident Data Division 
cCOMSIS Research Corporation data for "active" first class holders 
Table E-5. Air Transport Pilot (ATP) Accidents Qassified as 
Pilot Error (1982-1988) 
Pilot 
Age 
Groups 
20-24 
25-29 
30-34 
35-39 
40-44 
45-49 
50-54 
55-59 
60-64 
65-69 
TOTAk 
Number 
of ATP 
Accidents 
44 
243 
357 
405 
319 
257 
232 
162 
124 
38 
uu 
Number of 
"Pilot Error" 
Accidents 
33 
151 
223 
248 
202 
144 
137 
93 
84 
21 
3U336 
Percent of 
Accidents Classified 
as "Pilot Error" 
75.0 
62.1 
62.5 
61.2 
63.3 
56.0 
59.1 
57.4 
67.7 
55.3 
tit* 
Source: NTSB Accident Data Division 
Table E-6. Commercial Pilot Accidents Classified as Pilot Error 
(1983-1986) 
Pilot 
Age 
Groups 
20-24 
25-29 
30-34 
35-39 
40-44 
45-49 
50-54 
55-59 
60-64 
65-69 
1 TOTAL 
Number of 
Commercial 
Pilot Accidents 
380 
613 
672 
877 
653 
467 
427 
323 
257 
101 
4J70 
Number of 
"Pilot Error" 
Accidents 
293 
448 
471 
624 
501 
353 
327 
242 
206 
84 
$M9 
Percent of 
Accidents Classified 
as "Pilot Error" 
77.1 
73.1 
70.1 
71.2 
76.7 
75.6 
76.6 
74.9 
80.2 
83.2 
744 
Source: NTSB Accident Data Division 
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Table E-7. General Aviation Accidents Classified as Pilot Caused 
(1982-1987) 
Pilot 
Age 
Groups 
16-19 
20-29 
30-39 
40-49 
50-59 
60-69 
70-79 
JL \ir Xj^VJLi .• 
Number of 
General Aviation 
Accidents 
214 
2,793 
4,358 
3,630 
2,819 
1,206 
200 
15,220 
Number of 
"Pilot Caused" 
Accidents 
178 
2,193 
3,366 
2,833 
2,165 
895 
159 
1 1 3 9 
Percent of 
Accidents Classified 
as "Pilot Caused" 
83.2 
78.5 
77.2 
78.0 
76.8 
74.2 
79.5 
IIS 
Source: AOPA Air Safely Database 
Table E-8. Flight Hour Distribution by Medical Certificate (1982-1988) 
Pilot 
Age 
Groups 
20-24 
25-29 
30-34 
35-39 
40-44 
45-49 
50-54 
55-59 
Subtotal 
60-64 
65-69 
W T A L 
Number of 
First Class 
Holders 
20,486 
48,948 
63,224 
69,877 
71,757 
70,652 
53,099 
24,117 
4B&M 
11,158 
1,548 
434,866 
First Class 
Total Flight 
Hours 
8,749,648 
29,793,969 
36,181,346 
40,244,200 
40,972,145 
41,998,712 
32,186,136 
14,444,590 
244^70,746 
5,333,372 
445,639 
25o,m?$7 
Annual Hours 
per First 
Class Holder 
427.1 
608.7 
572.3 
575.9 
571.0 
594.4 
606.2 
598.9 
57SUJ 
478.0 
287.9 
575.7 
Number of 
Second Class 
Holders 
53,956 
73,015 
82,490 
102,094 
95,195 
74,374 
62,079 
40,178 
583,361 
49,478 
19,950 
$$2£A5> 
Second Class 
Total Flight 
Hours 
8,461,349 
12,723,406 
15,479,632 
21,199,709 
19,646,455 
14,776,983 
11,878,318 
7,736,850 
111^02>702 
9,196,933 
3,062,826 
mio,4« 
Annual Hours 
per Second 
Class Holder 
156.8 
174.3 
187.7 
207.6 
206.4 
198.7 
191.3 
192.6 
191*8 
185.9 
153.5 
iwu 
Number of 
Third Class 
Holders 
157,930 
215,035 
245,900 
243,138 
216,215 
177,783 
159,571 
118,827 
1,534,399 
122,561 
47,545 
JU704,$0$ 
Third Class 
Total Flight 
Hours 
4,134,468 
6,653354 
9,394,306 
11,370,428 
11,835,156 
10,740,408 
10,005,544 
7,571,636 
71,705^06 
7,869,178 
3,067,876 
ztMtsm 
Annual Hours 
per Third 
Class Holder 
262 
30.9 
38.2 
46.8 
54.7 
60.4 
62.7 
63.7 
' 4 t t 
64.2 
64.5 
4Z& 
Source: COMSIS Research Corporation for active airmen with >0 hours per year 
